my concern with that is, and we have heard from both sides of the aisle on this issue, we have a very successful fast track recall program at the CPSC and this will impede the process and the speed at which products with be taken out of…

Suggesting that Congress has a role to play by voting on sanctions relief years from now once a deal has run its course, that to me is disingenuous.

I am hopeful that the SEC will provide some clear guidance on these issues in the future.

I do think that it is going to be a considerable amount of time under the calculus that the administration is working under when they intend to come to Congress for that vote and that is very, very concerning.

But that is why we are here today. You are putting this stock in Iran's signature to the NPT and its safeguards agreement, right? They have had those same commitments. They have been violating those commitments for years.

If Congress will be asked to roll back its sanctions on Iran, then there must be a substantial rollback of Iran's nuclear program.

This committee has been at the forefront of examining the threat of a nuclear Iran.

How can we expect Iran to uphold an agreement when they are not meeting their current commitments?

I think the biggest issue with ROVs is that there is this pursuit by the majority in the Commission to get to a mandatory standard.

You can't have real verification going forward unless you have that revealed to the IAEA.

It is the House of Representatives that has driven this process.

The general way a voluntary standard and the ANSI standards are done is not public.

I implore you to convey those views immediately, if you would, to Secretary Kerry and the negotiating team.

I hope that today's hearing will renew our relationship of working together to keep America's consumers safe from unreasonable risk of injury or harm.

Would they be investing money into that or would they be investing it into their own country?

By holding this hearing in the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications, the committee is sending a strong message to the American public that chemical security is a shared responsibility.

Is it prudent for the United States of America to go forward with this versus backing up from the negotiation table?

One lesson is clear. Civilian nuclear programs flourish only through cooperation and openness. Secrecy and isolation are typically signs of a nuclear weapons program.