We can't look at Iraq in isolation, do you agree with that?

So that concept continues to this day.

Let's turn to the important role played by the National Guard and the Army Reserve.

The surge is moving forward, successfully. But the Maliki Government is sliding backwards, and is failing in the partnership that was established as the predicate, the foundation, for the surge concept of January 10.

I think the greatest asset we have today is the All-Volunteer Force.

That's a serious turn of events.

I do not anticipate any change in the policy of nuclear testing. As a matter of fact, I think it's important that we continue to lead as a Nation in terms of the nonproliferation efforts to strengthen that policy.

It seems to me we ought to have some sort of a test case before we in a widespread manner begin to provide arms to certain segments of the Sunni population.

We have the continuing problem over there of the drug elimination, which is at the core of funding.

For example, there are no caveats on the U.S. force, the British force, and I think, one or two of the others.

I don't know whether you had the opportunity, Mr. Vickers, to read in the New York Times today an article by Michael Gordon.

I would like to have you provide for the record hopefully your commitment that you will come back to Congress.

Sixty percent of the known oil reserves--I'm not talking just about Iraq--are in that region.

We have to address the consequences in Iran.

I think it's important that we take a look at this thing.

only a third of Baghdad has really been subjected to the January 10 doctrine of the President.

the President report to Congress on July 15 with regard to the situation in that AOR, specifically Iraq.

Again, your segment of overall DOD responsibility was pretty well carved out and created by Congress.