Rob Wittman

Has the Army participated in the overseas posture review and does the Army believe that the overseas force structure is correct in terms of position and size?

With the exception of the Army and Air Force, the other Service Chiefs generally indicated last year that they did not anticipate any major closures or realignments as a result of a future BRAC authorization.

The difference between the commissions cost estimates and the actual costs identified by GAO varied significantly in BRAC 2005, with a 66% increase over the commission's estimate.

Please provide an update as to when the Department is expected to complete the Study on Overseas Basing Presence of United States Forces required in Section 347 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012.

Considering the significant variability associated with the budget and the resulting force structure, is it premature to initiate a BRAC round?

GAO recommended that targets for eliminating excess capacity be provided as a selection criterion.

Considering BRAC 2005 will not realize a payback on the $35 billion investment until 2018, can we afford to exacerbate the budget constraints?

Has the Secretary of Defense assessed whether excess infrastructure exists in the Department?

BRAC 2005 was an absolute failure.

I believe that the Department of Defense needs a robust military capacity and that any diminution of this capacity should be staunchly opposed.

Having budget decisions driving strategy is both immoral and only increases the likelihood of service men and women not returning from future combat.

I categorically reject this notion that presumes to balance the Federal budget on the backs of our service members.

I haven't heard anything today that indicates that there is a rational basis to pursue a BRAC, nor are there dollars available during these very austere times by which to pursue a BRAC.

During the Navy Posture Hearing of February 16, 2012, the Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert and Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Amos said they did not see any bases they needed to close.

How will the decision to withdraw two BCTs from Europe impact the realignment decisions in the United States?

The question then becomes strategically what is our focus? Is it the budget driving strategy or strategy driving the budget?

So am I safe to assume from that then you are saying there is no empirical evidence that has been put together to support additional rounds of BRAC?

What I don't want is for us to be put in a position at any future time under any future construct where somebody says you have to close, you know, 20 bases or eliminate 20,000 jobs.

Looking at the savings and the costs from the 2005 BRAC, if you were to take the $35 billion cost of that particular BRAC and play it out over the period of time, that would have bought the United States three additional aircraft carriers.

My question is this. We know under any scenario of BRAC taking place historically that it takes years to accrue those savings.

I continue to have significant reservations with authorizing another BRAC round because of critical flaws in terms of both the process and the underlying assumptions.

I want to call to order the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness and today's hearing concerning the need for a BRAC.

We need to turn it over to the States for at least the first 20 fathoms.

I would like to call to order the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness.

Make no mistake--our readiness crisis is real and it's important to understand exactly what's at risk.