Rob Wittman

In the absence of the OCO budget for consideration before the Congress at this time, can you please describe the impact of OCO funding on your ability to provide 'ready' and trained forces?

As you know, when we get that energy footprint down, it is money we can plow back into the force structure and the systems that we need for the Navy in the future.

Where do we need to be as far as fleet size to really do the things that we need to do?

We have to be able to know what we can do in order to battle for those resources.

How do you define 'readiness'? And, ready for what? And, will the forces be 'ready' in both FY13 and FY14?

In light of the existing shortfalls in the FY13 O&M accounts, what are your greatest concerns about the Navy's readiness?

I have always been a proponent to say that strategy needs to drive budget, not budget driving strategy.

I believe our ship capability is the cornerstone of this Nation's defense structure.

What can Congress do to keep the retirement of those nine ships from happening in fiscal year 2014?

The requirement is 38 amphibious ships. The Navy and the Marine Corps for several years have agreed that the 33 is a fiscally constrained requirement.

We know that our combatant commanders request that capability quite often for things like security cooperation and crisis response and regional deterrence.

I certainly understand resource issues, but from our standpoint, too, we need to be making the argument about where the resources need to be.

My concern is, where we are going; where are we going to end up with capability, especially in light of reset and needing to make sure we have that capability in an area, as we know, that is going to be a challenge and where naval assets…

How do you intend to employ these ships over the next two fiscal years, and how do you intend to use the funds that Congress has allocated if not for the purpose of modernizing these assets as Congress intended?

I wanted to refer to this chart specifically and tell you of my concern about the unsatisfactory track the Navy is proposing on the current inventory projection.

I strongly believe that our long-term naval and Marine Corps strategies cannot be articulated until the budgetary pressures get resolved.

Welcome to the Readiness Subcommittee.

And, as you know, for Virginia and for the East Coast, this means jobs, it means energy independence, and especially with the potential opportunities there for natural gas and oil.

So, I just wanted to know why should it take nearly a decade, if we are going to wait until 2017, why should it take over a decade for us to learn the lessons from the Gulf...

I think we have understood what happened with the accident down there in the Gulf, and currently no lease sale could take place off of Virginia until 2017.

There is agreement across Virginia, across our congressional delegation and within the State, to make sure that this happens.

I appreciate the efforts that you are putting forth to get our energy policy on track, especially as it relates to the Outer Continental Shelf.

I was alarmed when General Odierno testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee yesterday that we are heading toward a hollow force and that budget cuts could threaten Army readiness levels on the Korean peninsula.

Allowing the Air Force to slip to a lower state of readiness requiring a long buildup to regain full combat effectiveness negates the essential strategic advantages of airpower and puts joint forces at risk.

And, again, thanks for your endurance on this most recent trip to Afghanistan.