We either have two choices. We either say we are not going to send them, which in many instances is not a choice, or if we send them, at increased risk to them and few of them coming back from the battlefield under that scenario.
Rob Wittman
The Public Record
Rob Wittman is a U.S. Representative for Virginia's 1st congressional district, having served since January 9, 2007. A member of the Republican Party, Wittman has focused on issues such as military readiness, veterans' affairs, and environmental protection. He has been an advocate for the Chesapeake Bay and has worked on legislation aimed at improving the health of the bay and its surrounding ecosystems.
Please describe your service's efforts to migrate enduring requirements into the base budget. How challenging has sequestration made that task? What is most at-risk?
How much excess capacity does the Air Force currently have with respect to installations and facilities?
Much of the $26 billion Opportunity, Growth, and Security Initiative (OGSI) Fund is aimed at mitigating short-term readiness shortfalls.
So, in the future, if we don't have OCO to reset the equipment that we need for any of these contingencies, that risk would drive up even higher.
Can you address the impact of the furlough on the military and civilian workforces? Have you seen spikes in post-furlough separations or retirements? Do you anticipate another furlough will be required?
We understand the challenges with this Nation's budget. We understand the deficit and the debt. Those things are very important, too. But we also understand our constitutional responsibility under Article I, Section 8.
The optimal force structure for the Marine Corps is 186,600 marines to meet all crisis response and steady-state requirements of the nation.
The budget request funds only 65% of facility sustainment requirements. What is the impact of this budget decision?
How will each of your services achieve the headquarters reductions ordered by Secretary Hagel and at the same time ensure critical functional capabilities are not lost?
Which readiness accounts are you most concerned about? What can we do to help?
How dependent are you on OCO for day-to-day operations? How will the dependence change after the majority of, or possibly all, combat troops are out of Afghanistan?
Although you may not be able to discuss specifics until the FY15 OCO budget is officially released, how confident are you in the adequacy of this year's OCO budget request? How much of your services' operations, maintenance, and training…
How did the Secretary's mandatory 20% headquarters cuts impact readiness accounts, if at all?
The budget request summary highlights support for the continuation Marine Unit Deployment Program (UDP) in FY15.
Can you articulate the impact of cancelled training that occurred over the last two years as a result of sequestration?
If funded at the budget request levels, what additional readiness shortfalls are present within the Army?
The Army in particular has faced cuts in force structure (depth/capacity) and deferred much needed modernization (capability).
Considering the significant variability associated with the budget and the resulting force structure, why does the Department feel that it is an appropriate time to request an additional BRAC round?
If we don't have that time, you are still going to expect us to deploy these soldiers and they are going to go at more risk.
Please provide an update as to when the Department is expected to complete the European Infrastructure Consolidation Initiative as required by Section 347 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012.
Please describe the enduring, non-Afghanistan-related requirements your service funds through OCO. How would you address those requirements in the absence of OCO?
In light of the civilian personnel hiring freezes and furloughs in FY2014, what impacts, if any, were there on the shipyards and aviation depots? How were they mitigated or what risk was assumed? What is the civilian personnel hiring plan…





