Rob Wittman

I am really dismayed about where we are putting our Air Force and all of our military branches with sequestration.

If something was to happen literally tonight in Korea, obviously, the people that were stationed in Korea and in Japan are the ones that would actually be doing the fighting tonight.

Our problem, of course, is that we have to balance readiness now for what now versus readiness 10 years from now.

I think it is extraordinarily important to look at sustainment plans, what elements should be in those sustainment plans...

Ladies and gentlemen, I will call to order the House Committee on Armed Services and the Subcommittee on Readiness to order.

As a bottom line up front, it is ISAF's assessment that the momentum achieved by the Taliban in Afghanistan since 2005 has been arrested in much of the country and reversed in a number of important areas.

What are specific conditions on the ground, relating to both Afghan National Security Force capabilities and the capabilities of the enemy you will be examining to manage the U.S. troop drawdowns?

General Dunford, what are your top concerns and challenges with the reset and redeployment of U.S. Forces from Afghanistan?

General Dunford, have you seen any decrease in the overall readiness of the U.S. forces that are being deployed to Afghanistan?

To what level are you able to repair your equipment now? Can you achieve the maintenance standards required in technical manual 10-20, or are you having to settle for less?

Does sequestration call into question our ability to maintain an Operational Reserve? What would be the impacts of reverting to a Strategic Reserve?

How will utilization of regionally aligned forces (RAFs) support the new strategic guidance?

Over the past 12 years, the Army--Active, Guard, and Reserve--has deployed more than 1.1 million soldiers to combat.

The strategy must drive where we need to go, what the Army must accomplish and then the force structure designed to accomplish that task.

The Army--Active, the Guard, and Reserve--has deployed more than 1.1 million soldiers to combat with more than 4,500 giving the last full measure of devotion to this country.

I call to order the Subcommittee on Readiness of the House Armed Services Committee.

Any degradation to operational readiness will be taken in non-deployed forces to the maximum extent possible.

In light of the fact that the Navy has spent the last six years operating a significant part of the force above a long-term sustainable tempo level, will the Navy be able to sustain its operations and meet enduring GFMAP requirements with…

Secretary Mabus, what are the operational impacts of civilian furloughs on fleet maintenance activities particularly in light of civilian hiring freezes and reduction to overtime work?

The Army has announced the reduction of 2,500 enablers as part of our force structure footprint reduction in EUCOM.

From an Army perspective, what will be the primary purpose of U.S. troops based in Europe once the regular deployments to Afghanistan are done?

Why would the Department request broad authority for an additional BRAC authorization when significant excess infrastructure does not appear to exist across the Department?

I am adamantly opposed to the pursuit of a BRAC at this particular time.

The only way I know to effectively eliminate excess infrastructure is to close installations.

The Government of Japan has transferred $948.3 million toward the agreed total contribution of $3.1 billion for construction activities to support the relocation of 4,700 Marines from Okinawa to Guam.