On the merits or demerits of these alternatives as to this very small part of the fleet of about 1,125,000 tons, our naval advisers are sharply divided.

I have not done so yet. It has not come in yet, but I will when it arrives.

The real issue in the treaty is whether we shall stop competitive naval building with all the destruction and the dangers to international good will that the continuation of that course implies; whether we shall spend an enormous sum in…

The program of the treaty does represent a decrease in destroyer and submarine strength.

We accomplish that without building a single ship.

There is not one scintilla of agreement or obligation of any character outside the treaty itself.

We thus attain parity in the battle fleet now instead of 10 years hence.

I have no other questions except one on the District appropriations, and I anticipate that the committees will be able to find some solution without stopping the works of the District.

The United States scraps three battleships, the British five, and Japan one, and postpones the enormous expenditure for renewals under the Washington Treaty until after 1936.

Now, the aircraft carriers, and the destroyers, and submarine programs of the treaty are fair, and they have not been subject to any particular criticism.

I regard it as a very important administrative step.

It may form a nucleus for collecting further funds for that purpose, all of which represents a useful step in the development of scientific research in connection with industry.