Rob Wittman

I am reminded of the words of John F. Kennedy himself, a proud Navy officer, when he said that history has taught us that control of the seas means security.

It is time to get serious and match our peer competitors with aggressive ship construction initiatives.

Unfortunately, I do not see steady progress towards fulfilling the goal of attaining a 355-ship Navy.

Ship construction is a long game and requires steady funding to achieve steady progress.

The future fleet must be timely--we need this more powerful fleet in the 2020s, not the 2040s.

Both China and Russia are able to compete on a global scale, in all domains, and at competitive speed.

Why is the Marine Corps considering going from a very reliable system to one that because of the geometry is almost certainly less reliable?

The sports parachute industry has been unable to develop reliable high glide canopies.

I believe that testing is critically important.

When the Army purchases parachutes, it relies on the engineers at U.S. Army Natick Soldier Systems Center to develop a specification addressing the military's unique requirements.

The Marine Corps has a large number of PARIS, Special Application Parachute (``SAP'') canopies that are high glide in inventory but that are seldom used.

I am not sure how you are soliciting for a new system without a new authorization.

The current approach to amphibious operations needed, and I quote, 'new operating concepts and capabilities that circumvent or defeat increasingly effective coastal defenses.'

I am particularly interested in our subject today of assessing our Marine Corps' ability to project forces in a contested environment.

I must admit that I have a particular affinity to the United States Marine Corps and its amphibious warfare role.

I call to order the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces.

We are so worried about the appearance of fairness that sometimes we act not in the best interest of the Nation.

Give us your thoughts and ideas about what we can accomplish.

So it will be logical, then, to assume that going forward the request would be to keep it at that level at least through 2019, which is when you would transition in 2020 to the new frigate class.

Scale of production is another important element.

The two elements that I think are extraordinarily important are time and resources.

It certainly does. And I appreciate your willingness to make sure you have discussions with us on the Hill.

The challenge before this committee is to ensure the correct high-low balance of surface combatants that best responds to fleet requirements in the most efficient manner.

What a list that is. And this is just the Navy.

It is our responsibility as members of these subcommittees to continue to better understand the readiness and force structure situation.