Jim Inhofe

Why does this treaty not specifically address rail-based launchers?

What decisions have been made to develop new systems to replace the current bombers, ICBMs, SLBMs, and ALCMs that will reach the end of their service lives in the 2030 to 2040 period?

Mr. D'Agostino, are you prepared to adjust the fiscal year 2012 budget to fully reflect the requirements articulated in the 1251 plan?

Mr. D'Agostino, do you agree with Director Anastasio's follow-up statement about the uncertainty of life extension and facility construction costs?

I would not support a budget that did not ensure the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear weapons deterrent.

Mr. D'Agostino, is the plan outlined in the 1251 report and the Stockpile Stewardship Management Program (SSMP) sufficient to produce the number of W76-1 life extension warheads needed to meet DOD requirements?

Mr. D'Agostino, does that plan align with the 1251 report and the SSMP?

Mr. D'Agostino, how is this addressed in future budgets?

Mr. D'Agostino, what is the status of the NWSP?

Dr. Miller, you say that one option to respond to Russian cheating is that we could quickly upload our own delivery systems.

Without the treaty's verification measures, the United States would have much less insight into Russian strategic forces, thereby requiring our military to plan based on worst-case assumptions.

Dr. Miller, according to open source reporting, the Russians are deploying a new 5,000 km nuclear-capable cruise missile on a new class of submarines.

Can the United States upload without the Russians realizing we were uploading?

Dr. Miller, both sides will have significant upload capability under this treaty.

If the Russians adopt a policy of denying the U.S. telemetry on their new systems deployed during the duration of the New START treaty, would we adopt the same policy?

The Senate would also be kept informed of such actions.

Dr. Miller, would U.S. security be enhanced by not transmitting and encrypting that information?

If Russia were to attempt to gain a political advantage by cheating or breakout, the United States could respond in several ways.

Any secret Russian deployments of any ballistic missiles or warheads in violation of New START treaty provisions would concern me due to the political significance of deliberate Russian cheating.

I do not think Russian cheating on New START would be irrelevant.

The United States could also choose to return a portion of its heavy bomber force to an alert posture.

Mr. D'Agostino, since 70 percent of these funds will not show up until 2016, what near-term risk do you foresee in this budget plan?

The New START treaty sets the stage for further negotiations with Russia on measures to reduce both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, including nondeployed nuclear weapons.

The New START treaty, as was the case in the START treaty, makes no distinction between nuclear or conventionally armed missiles.

The United States could substantially upload the ballistic missile submarine leg of the triad with hundreds of additional warheads.