Jim Inhofe

Senator Inhofe. General Chilton, what's the likelihood that we would detect this in a timely manner?

Mr. D'Agostino, you also state that one of your priorities is to 'strengthen the science, technology, and engineering base,' yet most of these funds are clearly for facility improvements.

What are your thoughts on how the United States will engage Russia on its overwhelming number of tactical nuclear weapons?

Mr. D'Agostino, will disconnects between the NWSP and the SSMP be resolved through an increased budget request starting in fiscal year 2012?

Will the United States maintain enough nondeployed warheads during the life of the treaty to fully upload each U.S. delivery system?

Dr. Miller, don't we need better verification at lower levels than we needed at higher force levels?

What other potential strategic or political consequences could result from various levels of Russian cheating?

Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller and General Chilton, you suggest it is stabilizing for the United States to deploy only single reentry vehicle ICBMs.

New START will reestablish a strategic nuclear arms control verification regime that provides intrusive access to Russian nuclear forces and a measure of predictability in Russian force deployments over the life of the treaty.

What assurances can you provide that the administration is committed to modernizing the above programs?

Is $100 billion a sufficient investment in our nuclear delivery systems over the next decade?

It represents a 10 percent increase in fiscal year 2011 over fiscal year 2010.

Dr. Miller, when was the last time the United States designed a new nuclear weapon?

Dr. Miller, does the United States today have the ability to design and produce a new nuclear weapon?

The fiscal year 2011 budget increase proposed by the administration is a positive first step towards revitalizing the nuclear weapons complex.

A disciplined, comprehensive and coordinated planning process could produce an annual long-term budget for the nuclear security enterprise.

It is important to reemphasize that the NSEIC proposal recommended a budget of $7.34 billion in fiscal year 2011.

Retaining confidence in the deterrent value of the U.S. nuclear forces depends on a number of factors.

Do you believe we should allow our labs to study what is possible in nuclear design in order to maintain our current expertise?

I remain concerned over our modernization efforts in the out-years.

Dr. Miller, do we allow our engineers and scientists to design new weapons?

So you don't think we're really competitive then, are we?

There was not one witness who was opposed to the New START treaty.

This is not any way a partisan suggestion.

We are confident that the U.S. military will be able to carry out its deterrence missions under the New START treaty.