The amount of the currency ought to be fixed by law, whether much or little.

There ought to be a limit, and no man ought to have the power at pleasure to enlarge or contract that limit. . . .

I do not think it wise to confer on the Secretary of the Treasury the power to meet the indebtedness not accruing for a year, or two, or three years.

I do not think it is necessary, in our present financial condition, to authorize him to go into market now and sell bonds at current market rates with a view to pay debts that do not mature for a year or two.

He may think it to his interest to retire the whole of the seven-thirties or the ten-forties; but is it wise for us to give him that power now, at the heel of the war and before things have settled down?

The difference between us is that I anticipate that the future of this country will be hopeful, buoyant, joyous.

I believe that if the Secretary of the Treasury would do nothing in the world except simply sit in his chair, meet the accruing indebtedness, and issue his treasury warrants, this debt will take care of itself, and will fund itself at four…

Now, nearly thirty years after the passage of this act, it is manifest that it was far the most injurious and expensive financial measure ever enacted by Congress.

It not only compelled the United States to pay the large war rates of interest for many years, but postponed specie payments until 1879.

His primary object was to convert United States notes into interest-bearing bonds, and thus force the immediate resumption of specie payments or the substitution of national bank notes for United States notes.

The result of this policy of contraction was not only to increase the burden of the public debt, but it created serious derangement of the business of the country.

The Greenback party, as it was called, grew out of this policy of contraction, and for a time threatened to carry the election of a majority of the Members of Congress.

If it shall not be speedily adopted and rigidly, but judiciously, enforced, severe financial troubles are in store for us.

If irredeemable notes were a national dishonor, why did he not urge their redemption in coin at some fixed period and then reissue them, and maintain their redemption by a reserve in coin?

It is easy now to perceive that a conservative use of United States notes, convertible into four per cent. bonds, would have steadily advanced both notes and bonds to par in coin.

Congress and the President are now drifting from each other into open warfare.

Congress is not weak in what it has done, but in what it has failed to do.

The civil rights bill and constitutional amendments can be defended as reasonable, moderate, and in harmony with Johnson's old position and yours.

As Congress has thus far failed to provide measures to allow legal Senators and Representatives to take their seats, it has failed in a plain duty.

He was elected by the Union party for his openly expressed radical sentiments, and now he seeks to rend to pieces this party.

He may varnish it up, but, after all, he must admit that he disappoints the reasonable expectations of those who intrusted him with power.

He may, by a coalition with copperheads and rebels, succeed, but the simple fact that nine- tenths of them who voted for him do not agree with him, and that he only controls the other tenth by power intrusted to him by the Union party…

Besides, he is insincere; he has deceived and misled his best friends.

I know he led many to believe he would agree to the civil rights bill, and nearly all who conversed with him until within a few days believed he would acquiesce in the amendments, and even aid in securing their adoption.

As for myself, I intend to stick to finance, but wherever I can I will moderate the actions of the Union party, and favor conciliation and restoration.