The financial condition of the counterparties was not a relevant factor in the decision to see to it that Goldman Sachs and other counterparties were paid 100 cents on the dollar.

We do not want investors, in the future or these particular firms to live with the expectation that the government bail them out.

So, if we're going to be effective in dealing with this, we have to find some way to mitigate both the stigma of coming and the fear of changes in the future rules of the game that are going to apply to them.

There must never be a TARP 2.0.

We do need a system in order to be able to liquidate large financial institutions.

But that's three months off. As the banks we're talking about how to wind down TARP.

Our time grows short, so we'll enter the lightning round here and try to get in at least one more question.

Isn't it time to debate what we want our institutions to be?

Perhaps most disturbing of all, TARP created an implicit government guarantee for major financial institutions.

TARP has been far from an unmitigated success.

TARP was an important part of the government's rescue strategy and it helped rescue the financial system from imminent collapse.

There are, though, real consequences to doing that, because now markets understand that you may, at any point, decide that anyone is large enough and that their debts should therefore be backed up by the U.S. taxpayers.