The point which I tried to present to the Senate, and which, I believe, was affirmed by a vote of the body, was simply this: that a man cannot sit as a judge in his own case.

How, then, does the principle of law, that no man shall sit as a judge in his own case, apply to him?

We are reminded that in a certain event the Senator may become President, and that on this account he is under peculiar temptations, which may swerve him from justice.

This is not a case of assault and battery, but a trial involving the destinies of this Republic.

Every Senator has his vote, to be given on his conscience.

If there be any “interest” to sway him, it must be that of justice, and the safety of the country.

The Senator from Ohio, whose vote is now in question, can see nothing but those transcendent interests by the side of which office, power, and money are of small account.

Put in one scale these interests, so dear to the heart of the patriot, and in the other all the personal temptations which have been imagined, and I cannot doubt, that, if the Senator from Ohio holds these scales, the latter will kick the…

To change this requirement is to fly in the face of the National Constitution.

Now, since the Chief Justice is not a “member” of the Senate, it is plain that he is positively excluded from vote on the final question.

It is easy to show that the language of the National Constitution, if seen in the light of English parliamentary history, must have an interpretation identical with its natural import.

If language employed in the National Constitution had already, at the time of its formation, received a definite meaning, it must be interpreted accordingly.

Thus, when the Constitution secures “trial by jury,” it secures that institution as defined by antecedent English law.

So, also, when it declares that the judicial power shall extend to “all cases in law and equity” arising under the National Constitution, it recognizes the distinction between law and equity peculiar to English law.

The powers of a presiding officer, where not specifically declared, must be found in Parliamentary Law.

Against this all vague speculation or divination of reason is futile.

I will not encumber this discussion by superfluous authorities.

The Chief Justice shall preside.” Such is the Constitution.

It is by misapprehension that this instance is supposed to sustain the present assumption.

When seen in its true light, it is found in harmony with the general rule.

As we advance in this inquiry, it will be seen that again and again it has been practically decided, that, whatever the powers of a presiding officer who is actually a member, a presiding officer who is not a member cannot rule or vote, or…

This is in accordance with all the authorities and unbroken usage; but it has peculiar value at this moment, because it is the text of Blackstone.

I cannot err in supposing that all these were authoritative guides at the time, and that the National Constitution was fashioned in all the various lights, historical and judicial, which they furnished.

My own judgment may be imperfect; but here is a mass of testimony, concurring and cumulative, without a single exception, which cannot err.

Plainly and unmistakably, the provision in our Constitution authorizing the Chief Justice to preside in the Senate, of which he is not a member, was modelled on the English original.