We are asked to vote that a fellow-man be handed over to Slavery without trial by jury.

To me this proposition is hateful beyond the power of words to express.

I insist, that, whatever the original intention of the framers of that clause, they did not leave it so as to cover fugitive slaves.

Where any language is open to two constructions, one beneficent and the other odious, that which is odious must be rejected.

And, Sir, if we go further and closely scan the clause, we find that the words employed are all applicable to a relation of contract or debt, and not to a relation founded on force.

The clause is applicable to a “person,” and not to a thing, and this “person” is to be surrendered on claim of the person to whom his service or labor may be due.

But, clearly, no labor or service can be due from slave to master.

Besides, as a jurist, the Senator surely will recollect the ancient truth, that injustice cannot be “law,” but is always to be regarded as an “abuse” or a “violence,” even though expressed in the form of “law.” In presence of this…

No ingenuity of honest effort can ever make the words cited by the Senator, or any other words in that much debated clause, sanction Slavery and the hunting of slaves.

If, where words are susceptible of two significations, one beneficent and the other odious, the former only can be taken, then must the Senator restrict this clause to that signification which is not odious.

And again, if every word is always to be construed so as most to favor Liberty, then must the Senator follow implicitly this rule.

But these two rules make it impossible to torture the clause into any odious or tyrannical signification.

To my mind nothing is clearer than that, according to unquestionable rules of interpretation, the clause of the Constitution, whatever the alleged intent of its authors, cannot be considered applicable to slaves.

Such is Slavery, that, from the nature of the case, it cannot be sanctioned or legalized except by “positive” words.

In the course of these studies he was gratified to find that there was no positive establishment of African Slavery in England, and, indeed, that the words “Slave” and “Slavery” were nowhere to be found in the British Constitution.

He next applied himself to the powerful array of well-known rules of interpretation, requiring, in case of doubt or question, that the interpretation should be on the side of Liberty, and especially that any man was “impious” and “cruel”…

Impiety and cruelty are not light burdens for an honest conscience.

The conclusion was irresistible, that Slavery could not exist in England.

He knew well that there was no statute of limitations against principles, and, better still, that principles must finally prevail over precedents.

Principles are immortal, and bloom with perpetual youth: precedents are mortal, and die from age, decrepitude, and decay.

Against principles precedents may for a while prevail; but the time comes when that which is mortal must yield to that which is immortal.

The judgment of Lord Mansfield constitutes a landmark of law, to be remembered proudly, when all his contributions to commercial law and general jurisprudence are forgotten.

It was a contribution to the British Constitution and to human rights.

Like every principle of Natural Law, it approves itself at once to the reason and conscience.

Let us at all hazards prevent the extension of Slavery and the increase of the Slave Power.