Charles Sumner has not belied the confidence inspired by a long and illustrious career.

He is as firmly as ever the friend of peace, and especially of peace between Great Britain and America.

So long as Slavery exists in the Union, there can be no peace.

The eloquent voice which has so often employed the stores of a richly furnished mind in persuasives to international amity has not, as the telegrams suggested, been inflamed by the heat of domestic conflict to the diffusion of discord…

But it is an appeal for justice, not an incentive to strife.

It is, however, an argument which does honor even to those against whom it is urged, and which aims to establish future relations of the closest alliance.

Not merely as the Senator for Massachusetts, the honored chieftain of the political Abolitionists, but as Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, he sees everywhere the presence of the Slave Power.

Against it he invokes, in periods of classic beauty and of fervid strength, all the moral forces of the mother country.

To England he makes a passionate and pathetic appeal--more for her own sake than that of the slave, more for the sake of the future than of present effects--that she withdraw all favor and succor from Rebel slave-owners.

I think he weighs the disadvantages and difficulties of our situation in a very fair and equal balance.

Sumner insisted was contrary to good morals and the Antislavery principles so constantly and loftily avowed by England.

Another question may also be asked: If Slavery be, as Earl Russell declared, “one of the most horrible crimes that yet disgrace humanity,” how could England make any concession to Rebels whose single declared object of separate existence…

It is evident that he begins to perceive the real issue of the conflict, and rightly estimates the direction of British sentiment.

Neither the sons of ’89 nor the country of Wilberforce will have this stain on their history.

At this moment our domestic relations all hinge upon one question,--How to treat the Rebel States.

Early or late triumph is inevitable,--perhaps by sudden collapse of the bloody imposture, or perhaps by slower and more gradual surrender.

For ourselves, we are prepared for either alternative, and shall not be disappointed, if constrained to wait yet a little longer; but when the day of triumph comes, political duties will take the place of military.

The victory won by our soldiers must be assured by wise counsels, so that its hard-earned fruits shall not be lost.

The relations of the States to the National Government must be carefully considered,--not too boldly, not too timidly,--that we may understand in what way or by what process the transition from Rebel forms may be most surely accomplished.

If I do not greatly err, it will be found that the powers of Congress, thus far so effective in raising armies and supplying moneys, will be important, if not essential, in fixing the conditions of perpetual peace.

The dogma and delusion of State Rights, as mischievously interpreted, which did so much for the Rebellion, must not be allowed to neutralize all that our arms have gained.

Strange will it be, if this extraordinary power, amply conceded to the President, is denied to Congress.

It may be done in every Rebel State; and if not in every other State of the Union, it will be simply because the existence of a valid State government excludes the exercise of this extraordinary power.

Assuming, that, as our arms prevail, it will be done in every Rebel State, we shall then have eleven military governors, all deriving authority from one source, ruling a population amounting to upwards of nine millions.

Let us at all hazards prevent the extension of Slavery and the increase of the Slave Power.