Cicero

For that is no unsympathetic or selfish or exclusive virtue, which protects even whole nations and consults their best interests.

There are splendid examples in history where the apparent expediency of the state has been set at naught out of regard for moral rectitude.

The influence of moral right is so potent, that it eclipses the specious appearance of expediency.

It is even worse than refusing to set a man on his way: it is deliberately leading a man astray.

The fact is that merely holding one's peace about a thing does not constitute concealment, but concealment consists in trying for your own profit to keep others from finding out something that you know, when it is for their interest to…

At all events he would be no candid or sincere or straightforward or upright or honest man, but rather one who is shifty, sly, artful, shrewd, underhand, cunning, one grown old in fraud and subtlety.

Pythius, therefore, and all others who do one thing while they pretend another are faithless, dishonest, and unprincipled scoundrels.

But that depends on our purpose in seeking prosperity; for we do not aim to be rich for ourselves alone but for our children, relatives, friends, and, above all, for our country.

To conclude, then, it is never expedient to do wrong, because wrong is always immoral; and it is always expedient to be good, because goodness is always moral.

Now the law disposes of sharp practices in one way, philosophers in another: the law deals with them as far as it can lay its strong arm upon them; philosophers, as far as they can be apprehended by reason and conscience.

Now reason demands that nothing be done with unfairness, with false pretence, or with misrepresentation.

For there is a bond of fellowship--although I have often made this statement, I must still repeat it again and again--which has the very widest application, uniting all men together and each to each.

The civil law is not necessarily also the universal law; but the universal law ought to be also the civil law.

But we possess no substantial, life-like image of true Law and genuine Justice; a mere outline sketch is all that we enjoy.

For the function of wisdom is to discriminate between good and evil; whereas, inasmuch as all things morally wrong are evil, trickery prefers the evil to the good.

And no greater curse in life can be found than knavery that wears the mask of wisdom.

For how few will be found who can refrain from wrong-doing, if assured of the power to keep it an absolute secret and to run no risk of punishment!

For my part, I do not believe that even genuine legacies are moral, if they are sought after by designing flatteries and by attentions hypocritical rather than sincere.

Suppose, then, that a good man had such power that at a snap of his fingers his name could steal into rich men's wills, he would not avail himself of that power--no, not even though he could be perfectly sure that no one would ever suspect…

But the righteous man, the one whom we feel to be a good man, would never rob anyone of anything to enrich himself.

To this type of good man, then, known not only to a Socrates but even to a Fimbria, nothing can possibly seem expedient that is not morally right.

Such a man, therefore, will never venture to think--to say nothing of doing--anything that he would not dare openly to proclaim.

Is it not a shame that philosophers should be in doubt about moral questions on which even peasants have no doubts at all?

For as the morally wrong cannot by any possibility be made morally right, however successfully it may be covered up, so what is not morally right cannot be made expedient, for nature refuses and resists.

Moreover, all our thought and mental activity will be devoted either to planning for things that are morally right and that conduce to a good and happy life, or to the pursuits of science and learning.