So am I safe to assume from that then you are saying there is no empirical evidence that has been put together to support additional rounds of BRAC?

Considering the significant variability associated with the budget and the resulting force structure, is it premature to initiate a BRAC round?

The Government of Japan has transferred $948.3 million toward the agreed total contribution of $3.1 billion for construction activities to support the relocation of 4,700 Marines from Okinawa to Guam.

BRAC 2005 was an absolute failure.

I want to call to order the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness and today's hearing concerning the need for a BRAC.

The difference between the commissions cost estimates and the actual costs identified by GAO varied significantly in BRAC 2005, with a 66% increase over the commission's estimate.

My question is this. We know under any scenario of BRAC taking place historically that it takes years to accrue those savings.

I categorically reject this notion that presumes to balance the Federal budget on the backs of our service members.

The question then becomes strategically what is our focus? Is it the budget driving strategy or strategy driving the budget?

Considering BRAC 2005 will not realize a payback on the $35 billion investment until 2018, can we afford to exacerbate the budget constraints?

Looking at the savings and the costs from the 2005 BRAC, if you were to take the $35 billion cost of that particular BRAC and play it out over the period of time, that would have bought the United States three additional aircraft carriers.

Having budget decisions driving strategy is both immoral and only increases the likelihood of service men and women not returning from future combat.

I continue to have significant reservations with authorizing another BRAC round because of critical flaws in terms of both the process and the underlying assumptions.

I haven't heard anything today that indicates that there is a rational basis to pursue a BRAC, nor are there dollars available during these very austere times by which to pursue a BRAC.

During the Navy Posture Hearing of February 16, 2012, the Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert and Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Amos said they did not see any bases they needed to close.

Has the Army participated in the overseas posture review and does the Army believe that the overseas force structure is correct in terms of position and size?

GAO recommended that targets for eliminating excess capacity be provided as a selection criterion.

How will the decision to withdraw two BCTs from Europe impact the realignment decisions in the United States?

Has the Secretary of Defense assessed whether excess infrastructure exists in the Department?

The only way I know to effectively eliminate excess infrastructure is to close installations.

What I don't want is for us to be put in a position at any future time under any future construct where somebody says you have to close, you know, 20 bases or eliminate 20,000 jobs.

With the exception of the Army and Air Force, the other Service Chiefs generally indicated last year that they did not anticipate any major closures or realignments as a result of a future BRAC authorization.

Why would the Department request broad authority for an additional BRAC authorization when significant excess infrastructure does not appear to exist across the Department?

I am adamantly opposed to the pursuit of a BRAC at this particular time.

We need to turn it over to the States for at least the first 20 fathoms.