The infrastructure investment accounts have taken a large portion of risk the last several years under constrained budgets.

The fiscal year 2016 military construction budget for the Department of the Navy includes a number of investments in energy-related construction projects on Navy and Marine Corps installations.

I think that is part of the discussion that has to take place.

Today we find ourselves in a threat scenario that is probably more complex than it has been at any time in our history.

We are also facing budgeting issues through sequester.

The Secretary of the Navy established energy goals that far exceed the requirements for the other military services, including 50% alternative energy ashore by 2020.

According to the EIC report, implementing EIC actions will not reduce the operational force structure or military capabilities in Europe, only excess infrastructure.

The term 'energy security' is defined by the QDR as having 'assured access to reliable supplies of energy and the ability to protect and deliver sufficient energy to meet operational needs.'

But asserting, like Ms. Hammack did, that somehow that tomorrow our men and women in uniform are going to get that training because we are going to start to close bases I think is a bridge too far.

We will call to order the Subcommittee on Readiness for the House Armed Services Committee.

The difference between requirements and resources equals risk.

According to the Department's report, implementing EIC actions will not reduce the operational force structure or military capabilities in Europe, only excess infrastructure.

The Navy has again proposed to defer investments in facilities sustainment, budgeting across the services at 84% of the model, on average, versus the recommended 90%.

Under constrained resources, the Department is balancing risk among force structure, modernization, and readiness to meet defense strategic requirements.

I think that is a great point.

The Army has again proposed to defer investments in facilities sustainment, budgeting across the services at 80% of the model, on average, versus the recommended 90%.

Any time that you are looking at the idea of installation capacity you want to make sure that as you are looking at that, alignment takes a front stage.

As we look at this in context, obviously we are coming out of conflicts, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom; coming into a realm of a more dangerous world; coming into a time of reset.

What we can know for certain is how he has responded without us providing weapons and that hasn't gone very well.

I think that is the key to make sure that the overlap is there so as Nimitz retires and the CVN-79 comes on board, we don't good through the situation we were with Ford and Enterprise, to make sure we don't have a gap there.

Give us some specifics about what those effects are.

I think that is why the questions about the assumptions that they make about needed capacity and whether that aligns with the strategies is such a critical question.

I think one of the concerns is that in haste to be able to save money we look at the short term.

It is unconscionable to require these services to continue to spend money on facilities they don't need while the budget caps require them to cut end strength, training, readiness, which puts American troops at unneeded risk.

if you get rid of base structure you will never get it back in that configuration.