There are direct costs of compliance, and then there are all the indirect costs of a reduction in innovation and dynamism that comes when regulators have the power to run these financial institutions like public utilities.

I do oppose the overall framework of Dodd-Frank, but it seems to me a couple of the most egregious laws are subjecting financial institutions that are not, in fact, systemically risky to these very onerous regulations imposes a real cost.

It strikes me that parts of Title II are problematic in the way they are written, problematic in doing a slow process.

One of the major ways is through the SIFI designations, which I would argue then precipitate the micromanagement of these financial institutions by a host of regulators in what will, in my view, ultimately be a futile attempt to make…

Management has to be all fired regardless of which managers are actually at fault.

I would just point--their work very significantly informed my judgment as we developed our legislation.

Credibility has to be established, and as we do that, of course, we will make mistakes.

Congress did this in an immense rush, and I do not think it was a very thoughtful solution.

I share that view, but rather than trying to guess what the right number is, because, frankly, I do not think $75 billion is the right number either.

The bank gets executed. I mean, that is the purpose as a practical matter.

The regulators themselves, as we know, are not omniscient. They are not going to be perfect. They are not going to always get it right, and in the end, eventually institutions will fail anyway.

What is your reaction to the idea that the Fed would be able to design its own rule, but it would be an objective, data-driven rule?