I think that too big to fail is a real concern. I think the real solution is to go to the heart of where the problem is.

But would you agree that in Title II of Dodd-Frank there is an explicit mechanism by which the regulators are empowered at their discretion to tap into taxpayer funding and execute a bailout of sorts.

So if, in fact, the Government comes along and bails out institutions, then there is obviously some level of expectation that the Government will do this again in the future.

what you want to do is eliminate the discretion, put a fixed set of rules in the hands of a bankruptcy judge

I think that is the basic mentality of Dodd-Frank.

In a market-based economy, in a capitalist system, in a free society, you have to be free to fail.

Well, I see my time is expired, but Mr. Chairman----

I wonder if a better approach is simply to make sure that the taxpayer is not an involuntary shareholder in the institution in the first place.

I think Dr. Admati has something she would like to add to this.

Failure has to be an option.

I would really seriously question the competence of the FDIC to run JPMorgan Chase or to run Lehman Brothers.

But what I understood you to say is that you agree with the premise that the actual activities of the bank ought to be given more weight than an arbitrary dollar value of assets?