However, when a general license subverts the law, when a general license ultimately swallows up the Congressional intent, as in the case of Cuba...

it just seems to me that the JCPOA has language in it under the sanctions section that suggests that somehow the Administration is tied toward not supporting reauthorization

I will not be supporting any legislation that creates general licenses for this or any other Administration because it basically--I can tell you, as the author of that law, it totally undermines what was the Congressional intent.

You do not check it. You accept an honor system. Yes, I am going under one of those 12 systems. Anybody can say that.

is it--what view do you have as it relates to renewing the Iran Sanctions Act, which is up for reauthorization at the end of this coming year?

there is no question that the secondary nature of the sanctions under the Iran Sanctions Act was a very significant hammer at the end of the day, would that be a fair statement?

the penalties that are set out in the Iran Sanctions Act are then referenced in a lot of these other [Iran sanctions] statutes I'm talking about, and that penalty structure is a very meaningful one.

That sends a message that you have to honestly pursue the law, not just generally use a general license as an open-ended process.

would it be fair to say that the Iran Sanctions Act was a significant tool in getting Iran to the negotiating table?

I would just simply say that four or five people on the ground as trained entities in the train-and-assist program, even as a tactic, could not possibly be a successful tactic to try to get the result that we want.

I do not see much really occurring.

What convinces you that we would be more successful this time if we employed that than we have been?