John Kerry

I think the other important point is that the U.S. intelligence judgments recently reaffirmed by General Clapper seem to continue to indicate that Iran has not made a decision to make a nuclear weapon.

I think the outreach of the Obama administration has served to expose the fact that Iran is the intransigent actor in this equation, not the United States.

I share Ambassador Pickering and General Cartwright's assessment that the risks of military action significantly outweigh the rewards of military action.

The United States will need to consider how and when that policy, or the Iranian perception of it, should come off the table.

I have personally advocated that we then should be willing to put on the table a positive response to Iran's interest in enriching material for civil purposes only--that is, below the 5 percent threshold.

I believe, quite frankly and very succinctly, that sanctions without an open door to a process to exploit the value of those sanctions in the diplomatic arena is a mistake.

Past talks have suffered, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, because they have been a series of one-night stands.

I have repeatedly urged the Obama administration to lessen our own need for foreign oil imports by permitting such things as the construction of the Keystone XL pipeline from Canada.

Iran, I think it is safe to say, presents the biggest foreign policy challenge facing the United States and others at this moment in time.

I continue to believe that our challenge lies in the achievement of an international consensus that presents the Iranian regime with the plain choice between pursuing its nuclear weapons program or preserving the economic viability of the…

I would argue that the most important role that we, the United States, can play in expediting change in Iran is to inhibit the Iranian regime's ability to control communication and to control information.

I think if we are going to resolve this issue diplomatically, we do have to provide Iran an exit path.

If I were Supreme Leader and I thought somebody was trying to change my regime, I guess I would be concerned about it too.

There are other issues nonnuclear, as you and Senator Lugar have pointed out, between the United States, the Western countries, and Iran.

To me, this is a good starting place.

According to American intelligence officials, obviously, there are serious questions that remain about whether Iran has, or has not, made a decision with respect to nuclear weapons.

I would argue that as long as Iran's current Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, remains in power, I think the likelihood that Iran will be willing to make meaningful and binding compromises on this nuclear program is not very high.

My recommendation is that we now take the sanctions pressure and turn it into a useful diplomatic tool.

Timing ought to take advantage of sanctions, but it ought to move the process when seemingly the other side, through its invitation, is ready.

That means we are on the verge of new talks.

The fundamental question for United States policymakers is whether a sanctions regime can be imposed that will verifiably stop Iran's nuclear weapons program.

Our past history at changing regimes has been pretty parlous.

The Obama administration has worked with a broad international coalition to assemble an unprecedented sanctions regime.

If we do not lift Jackson-Vanik, we are denying our own workers access.

We ought to do the things we say we are going to do.