George F. Hoar

It shows the rudeness of the mechanism by which the Chief Executive of this country is selected, and what apparently slight and trivial matters frequently determine the choice.

Is it likely that public virtue would withstand the temptation of the Presidency?

There was never yet a political party in this country, or in England, which decided ordinary election cases, except in the clearest case, on other than party considerations.

The danger of mistake or fraud is surely quite as great if the final power be lodged in Congress, and the framers of the Constitution acted in nothing more wisely than in removing from Congress all power over the election of President.

The answer is that the Constitution of the United States gives no jurisdiction to Congress, when the certificates are opened and the votes are to be counted, to correct such mistakes or frauds.

Such investigations, possible only to the most limited extent now, would have been wholly impossible as to most of the States when the Constitution was adopted.

It seems to me clear that the power to judge of elections, returns, and qualifications of presidential electors is not given by the Constitution to the two Houses of Congress, or either of them.

But, in general, wherever I go I find that intelligent men of both parties are satisfied with the righteousness of the decision, and admit that a different judgment would have wrought the destruction of the Republic.

I believe that as time goes on, the great self-restraint of the American people in dealing with the momentous peril of 1877, and the constructive ability which created the simple but perfect mechanism of the Electoral Commission, will…

It would have been a worse civil war than that of the Rebellion, because the country would have been divided not by sections, but by parties.

When I went to Washington for the session of December, 1876, while I did not believe there would be a civil war, and supposed there would be some method of escape devised, I confess I saw no such method.

It seems to me most able profound and convincing and I congratulate you immensely on the effort which is spoken of by all who have read it as most vigorous and successful.

I have just read with the greatest interest and satisfaction your speech on the jurisdiction in the impeachment case.

My mind was soon satisfied that the narrow construction which left the accused to decide whether to abide his trial or by resignation to defeat the jurisdiction of the court could not possibly be correct.

I have read with satisfaction and admiration your exhaustive and conclusive argument in the Belknap impeachment case.

My own opinions are strongly adverse to the jurisdiction, and I should greatly lament its maintenance by the Senate.

It seems to me a very complete and able presentation both of law and reasons of State on your side.

The argument is sensible and exhaustive, the style clear, forcible and attractive and the whole tone temper and spirit becoming a jurist and statesman.

If preserved in full vigor, and exercised with perfect integrity, every branch will perform its duty.

I am satisfied that the opinion of the majority of the Senate will prevail hereafter, unless the case where the question shall come up be, like that of Belknap, strongly affected by party feeling.

It seems incredible that it could ever have been intended that this judgment of perpetual disqualification to hold office could only be rendered when the defendant is willing, and can be avoided by his voluntary resignation.

It is obvious that impeachment and removal from office will be in many cases an insignificant and unimportant part of the remedy as compared with perpetual disqualification from holding office.

The history of this clause as found in the proceedings of the Convention that framed the Constitution, makes very clear the understanding of that body.

It is difficult to believe that the Senators who voted for acquittal were not, perhaps unconsciously, influenced by the desire to shield a political associate from punishment.

The whole struggle was over the question of the Constitutional right of the Senate to convict a public officer on impeachment proceedings instituted after he had left office.