Elizabeth Warren

We do not want investors, in the future or these particular firms to live with the expectation that the government bail them out.

The financial condition of the counterparties was not a relevant factor in the decision to see to it that Goldman Sachs and other counterparties were paid 100 cents on the dollar.

It's very important to have this debate and we're having it now in Congress.

Isn't it time to debate what we want our institutions to be?

I think, actually, this is a program that's doing quite well in delivering a very meaningful improvement in the basic financial economic position.

So, your statement here today is, the reason we're having a problem with small business lending is that you're making the money available to the small banks and they just won't come.

But, I thought you started by saying you were going to terminate and wind down the Capital Purchase Program.

So, let me just, if I can, pinpoint--how can it be that we can manage to put hundreds of billions of dollars into the hands of very large financial institutions, in what was effectively a matter of days, and 14 months into TARP, we're…

Perhaps most disturbing of all, TARP created an implicit government guarantee for major financial institutions.

Let's keep in mind this is about whether or not the investors in these mortgages, some of whom made substantial profits during the glory days, should be required to take the losses when the mortgages that they invested in turn out not to…

TARP has been far from an unmitigated success.

Another that I am deeply concerned about is the extent to which the current programs that Treasury advances send a signal to investors in mortgages.

So, if we're going to be effective in dealing with this, we have to find some way to mitigate both the stigma of coming and the fear of changes in the future rules of the game that are going to apply to them.

TARP was an important part of the government's rescue strategy and it helped rescue the financial system from imminent collapse.

When various forms of this creative banking triggered the economic crisis, the banks went to Washington for a handout, and all the while top executives kept their jobs and retained their bonuses even though the tax dollars that supported…

Pundits talk about populist rage, as a way to trivialize the anger and fear coursing through the middle class, but they have it wrong. Families understand with crystalline clarity, that the rules that they have played by, are not the same…

So, if I'm understanding you correctly, you're saying that the advantage to breaking up the big banks is, we end up with more banks that can fail, because we let them fail, but more banks, then, that can figure out their profitable models…

TARP was not designed merely to rescue large banks; the broader, long-term goals were aimed at strengthening the overall economy.

The problems are unmistakable. Uncertainty persists about the stability of our financial institutions.

What's our model, here? Should we all just go to Las Vegas and bet it all on black-22?

TARP has also failed to check the culture of excessive risktaking that brought on this crisis.

We helped out Wall Street, and we left everyone else hanging.

Are you saying it is not lawful for the Secretary of the Treasury to put the shares of stock in Chrysler and GM into trust?

I should say Treasury is still not considering the panel's recommendation to put the shares of stock of the auto industry and the large financial institutions in trust?

But surely, we do not need a whole TARP apparatus to be----