John Morley

There is no doubt that a very grave situation is upon us, a little sooner or a little later.

All my desire and thought was how to render it less grave, for next to the demands of a question far higher than all or any party interests, is my duty to labour for the consolidation of the party....

Gladstone was not disposed on any terms to meet the Irish demand by more coercion.

The violent scenes that attended the Coercion bill of 1881, the interchange of hard words, the suspensions, the imprisonments—all mechanically acquiesced in by the ministerial majority—had engendered both bitterness and contempt.

The Irishmen did not conceal the satisfaction with which they saw the defeat of some of those liberals who had openly gloated over their arrests and all the rest of their humiliations.

Gladstone wrote in a final memorandum (December 24) of this eventful year, “I used every effort to obtain a clear majority at the election, and failed.

Historians coolly dissect a man’s thoughts as they please; and label them like specimens in a naturalist’s cabinet.

They might adhere to the conciliatory policy of the summer and autumn, keep clear of repressive legislation, and make a bold attempt in the direction of self-government.

It was that ordinary law had broken down, and that exceptional means of repression were indispensable.

Gladstone that even though home rule might perhaps not be in a parliamentary sense before the House, it was in a most distinct manner before the country, and no political party could avoid expressing an opinion upon it.

Until then, why string together the commonplaces and generalities of great things, really unfelt?...

I am certain there is one keen and deep desire to be extricated from the life of contention in which a chain of incidents has for the last four years detained me against all my will.

But I know truly that I am not worthy of this liberty with which Christ makes free his elect.

They are now, most rashly not to say more, working the Irish question to split the liberal party.

It seems to me that if a gratuitous declaration of this kind is made, it must produce an explosion; and that in a week’s time Hartington will have to consider whether he will lead the liberal party himself, or leave it to chaos.

The first, a hope that I might be able to contribute towards some pacific settlement of the Irish question.

The second, a desire to prevent the splitting of the party, of which there appeared to be an immediate danger.

But it may at any moment be lost, and the most disastrous mode of losing it perhaps would be that now brought into view.

It would be certainly opposed to my convictions and determination, to attempt to lead anything like a home rule opposition, and to make this subject—the strife of nations—the dividing line between parties.

It has been unreasonably imputed to me, that the proposal of home rule was a bid for the Irish vote.

The fact is that I could not rely upon the collective support of the liberals; but I could and did rely upon the support of so many of them as would make the success of the measure certain, in the event of its being proposed by the tory…

Home rule, rightly understood, altered indeed the terms of the Act of Union, but adhered to its principle, which was the supremacy of the imperial parliament.

I thought it would be morally fatal if this tone were extensively adopted on the liberal side; so I determined on an effort to secure reserve for the time, that our freedom might not be compromised.

The great issue was thus at last brought suddenly and nakedly into view.

I would use my best endeavours to make these States independent in matters of administration.