John Morley

Lord Salisbury’s clear and rationalising understanding might have been expected to carry him to a thoroughgoing experiment to get rid of a deep and inveterate disorder.

On the other hand, Lord Salisbury’s hesitation in facing the perils of an Irish settlement in reliance upon the co-operation of political opponents is far from being unintelligible.

The whole stream of public excitement is now turned upon me, and I am pestered with incessant telegrams which I have no defence against, but either suicide or Parnell’s method of self-concealment.

I consider that Ireland has now spoken; and that an effort ought to be made by the government without delay to meet her demands for the management by an Irish legislative body of Irish as distinct from imperial affairs.

Only a government can do it, and a tory government can do it more easily and safely than any other.

As to intentions, I am determined to have none at present, to leave space to the government—I should wish to encourage them if I properly could—above all, on no account to say or do anything which would enable the nationalists to establish…

I have in truth thought it my duty without in the least committing myself or any one else, to think through the subject as well as I could, being equally convinced of its urgency and bigness.

There shall be no private negotiation carried on by me, but the time may come when I shall be obliged to speak publicly.

Unluckily it would seem to need at least the genius of a Bismarck, to perform with precision and success the delicate office of inspiring a modern oracle on the journalistic tripod.

No statesman in our history has ever been more careful of the golden rule of political strategy—to neglect of which Frederick the Great traced the failure of Joseph II.—not to take the second step before you have taken the first.

Never was there a moment when every consideration of political prudence more imperatively counselled silence.

They have shown that as far as regards the great majority of them, they are earnestly in favour of a change in the administration of their government, and of some system which would give them a larger control of their domestic affairs.

How can we decide without knowing or trying to know, both if we can, but at any rate the second?

Meantime I care not who knows my anxiety to prevent that severance, and for that reason among others to avoid all communications of ideas and intentions which could tend to bring it about.

I am confident the nationalists know my desire.

The basis of our system is that the ministry shall have the confidence of the House of Commons.

Might I go so far as to say at the first meeting that in the case supposed, I should only accept the trust if assured of the adequate, that is of the general, support of the party to a plan of duly guarded home rule?

If that support were withheld, it would be my duty to stand aside.

With me the Irish question would of course remain paramount; but preferring a liberal government without an adequate Irish measure to a tory government similarly lacking, such a liberal government would be entitled to the best general…

Is it not a novelty which strikes at the root of our parliamentary government? under which the first duty of a majority freshly elected, according to a uniform course of precedent and a very clear principle, is to establish a government…

The Irish will know three things—(1) That I am conditionally in favour of at least examining their demand. (2) That from the nature of the case, I must hold this question paramount to every interest of party. (3) That a part, to speak…

Can it be supposed that in these circumstances they will long refrain, or possibly refrain at all?

An immense loss of dignity in a great crisis of the empire would attend the forcing of our hands by the Irish or otherwise.

The present leaning of my mind is to consider the faults and dangers of abstention greater than those of a more decided course.

I would use my best endeavours to make these States independent in matters of administration.