I think, just before I get my last question in for Ms. Farrell, we need both reciprocity and portability.

Just last month, at an open hearing the Director of National intelligence, Director Coats, said that our security clearance process is, in his words, 'broken and needs to be reformed.'

If we can use technology; and two, the closer we can get, at least at the SECRET level, on one standard, one form, one adjudication, and one clearance.

I'm disappointed, and I know you are as well, that OMB did not take our invitation to actually participate.

In January of this year--and I again appreciate the GAO witness today--placed the security clearance process on its, quote, 'high-risk list' of areas that the government needs broad-based transformation or reforms.

Stabilizing at 700,000 is not acceptable. It's just not acceptable.

I think we particularly lose on the government side, where people would come in and serve at a much perhaps lower salary than they would on the industry side, but because of the security clearance.

I think getting more members engaged, because we are losing good people.

the backlog of 700,000 security clearance cases is our industry's number one priority.

My view is that stress testing is the most important prudential standard and that frequent stress tests are some of the best tools we have to prevent another financial crisis.

I think Dodd-Frank, for all its challenges, has made our system remarkably stronger.

I think it is very, very important when people go about talking about doing away with stress tests or eliminating any kind of enhanced prudential regulations, that is not our intent.

We are not touching anything on the largest institutions in terms of the annual stress test on folks above 250.

Federal employees with professional degrees are actually undercompensated relative to private-sector peers in a CBO analysis.

I just want to make sure that you are going to assure me that within the responsibilities that you have... that you will do all you can to combat any impressions that that kind of loyalty test or political affiliation test would become…

I'm concerned that China has developed an all-of-society, not just all-of-government, but all-of-society, approach to gain access to our sensitive technologies and intellectual property.

We intend to have an overview of our findings that will be public.

Make no mistake, this threat did not begin in 2016, and it certainly didn't end with the election.

I think the companies themselves are slow to recognize this threat.

We intend to make recommendations that will enhance the likelihood that the security of our election process is in place.

Senator Warner called me last week. We had a discussion on that.

we're hearing again a lot of commonality as we think about cyber, misinformation, and disinformation.

I think it's very telling in terms of how we view worldwide threats.

This threat I believe demands a whole-of-government response, and that response needs to start with leadership at the top.

We will continue to work towards conclusions related to any cooperation or collusion by any individual, campaign, or company.