Thomas Daschle: “General Butler summarizes his experience in the following terms: I came to a set of deeply unsettling judgments. That…”

“General Butler summarizes his experience in the following terms: I came to a set of deeply unsettling judgments. That from the earliest days of the nuclear era, the risks and consequences of nuclear war have never been properly weighed by those who brandished it. That the stakes of nuclear war engage not just the survival of the antagonists, but the fate of mankind. That the likely consequences of nuclear war have no politically, militarily, or morally acceptable justification. And therefore, that the threat to use nuclear weapons is indefensible. General Butler goes on to note that for much of the Cold War period up to the present, America's massive nuclear arsenal was justified and sustained on the basis of a single concept: deterrence. However, his experience and analysis led him to the inherent flaw in the concept of deterrence. Deterrence failed completely as a guide in setting rational limits on the size and composition of military forces. To the contrary, its appetite was voracious, its capacity to justify new weapons and larger stocks unrestrained. Deterrence carried the seed . . . that spurred an insatiable arms race. Mr. President, the consequences of this paradox remain with us today--despite the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War. Consider where the world is with respect to nuclear weapons as we approach the end of the 20th century--over 50 years since man developed the first nuclear device.…”