Jim Langevin

The limited visibility into the cost and schedule for EPAA reflect the oversight challenges with the acquisition of missile defense capabilities that we have previously reported.

How has EUCOM's cyber threat environment changed over the past year, and where do you see it going in the near term?

How has your communication with other countries changed as a result of the inclusion of cyber in the 2010 NATO strategic concept?

To what extent is EUCOM involved with cyber threats that are associated with terrorism and organized crime?

I have been very concerned over time about the capabilities of our bases here in the United States to withstand a cyber attack directed against outside supporting infrastructure such as the electric grid.

If we could go back to the issue of cyber. And to the panel, what do we need to change to ensure that we are better able to identify and mitigate risks in cyber domain?

Very good. I look forward to reading that report.

Are there particular concerns that you have with regards to the health of the DOD R&D community that we need to address?

I am pleased to see the emphasis on cybersecurity in each of your testimony.

The Internet, when it was built, was never built with security in mind, and I guess unfortunately.

Obviously, one of the priorities that I have, too, is making sure that we are continuing to develop the cyber workforce.

Like all of us on this committee, I believe that much of our Nation's military and economic strength lies in our ability to lead the world in innovation and that the defense science and technology enterprise continues to be a major…

I continue to be concerned about the overall strength and size of the nation's cybersecurity workforce.

I have long maintained, as you probably know, a strong interest in mitigating vulnerabilities in cyberspace.

Let me say that we all need to recognize that, alone, simply moving boxes on an organizational chart isn't going to resolve these problems.

It is going to take leadership, both within the Administration and up here on Capitol Hill--as well as a consensus on why NNSA's mission is so important.

Has the privatization of the labs contributed to the loss of senior personnel?

What pressures, if any, result from a fee-based incentive system?

A number of employees including the unions who provided testimony to the NAS panel, and at least one former lab director, have expressed concern that the private for-profit model is harming the labs in that many senior scientists have…

The impetus for the fiscal year 2012 National Defense Authorization's request for this National Academies of Science study was concerned about safety issues.

Ranking Member Sanchez and I have agreed to take a hard look at these issues over the next few months.

I would like to say that, alone, simply moving boxes on an organizational chart isn't going to solve these problems.

Governance, oversight, and management of the nuclear security enterprise to ensure high quality science, engineering, and mission effectiveness in an age of austerity.

Mr. Langevin. Mr. Secretary, do you feel confident that the command relationships between 10th Fleet/Fleet Cyber Command, U.S. Cyber Command, and other Service cyber organizations are now adequately clarified?

I firmly believe America is still dangerously vulnerable to a cyber attack against our networks in general and our electric grid in particular.