It just seems an extraordinary coincidence that something so counterintuitive to suggest that some of the most troubled economies of Europe could have a zero risk weighting.

Why should we be confident that there is not politically motivated financial repression creeping into this regulatory regime?

I would argue that the explicit exemption of U.S. Treasurys from the Volcker Rule is an example of financial repression in the United States.

Well, one of the things that really concerns me is that it is very likely to be very significant compliance costs for institutions that nobody has ever suggested are systemically significant and why we would, you know, force this cost on…

I think that Ms. Couch's remarks demonstrate why it is a compromise, and some of the potentials that concern her are exactly what I think makes the bill attractive to those who are concerned about the open-endedness of housing assistance.

I think this is the wrong way to go.

I just want to strongly urge you to reconsider the position that the SEC needs to adopt a new round of regulations now, for several reasons.

I think we should have, absolutely.

I know you fully appreciate the importance of this index, how widely used it is for all kinds of transactions and how the American financial system--I do not want to say it is dependent on it, but it is totally integrated into this.

I just feel strongly that the problems facing our economy are not monetary in nature.

Did it not occur to somebody to bring the financial institutions together and say, hey, you probably ought to consider a different way of establishing your floating rate resets because there is this integrity problem?

I am very disturbed about the destruction of what little confidence might remain in our financial system.

Could you tell us what is the definition that you have used to define an instance of this voluntary support that gets you to this count of 300?

I really find that extraordinary in light of the actual history.

I will go out on a limb. It seems to me that there is a majority on the Commission that does not share your view on this.

How about the number of instances since the 2010--precisely how many of the 300 occurred after the new regulations were imposed in 2010?

So would it be fair to say that in many instances, these--many of the instances that she is citing are really manifestations of the strength of an industry rather than weakness?

If a fund is going to break the buck, it is going to break the buck, and capital support is there.

I do believe very much that it is exactly that and that it is guaranteed to fail in that respect.

Like virtually 100 percent of the cases, it was because they had bad loans.

It seems to me that if we have a banking activity, the very nature of which is to take risk in extending credit, some of those banks, especially during tough economic times, are going to fail.

I think the emphasis on capital as a general matter is exactly the right direction that we ought to be heading in.

I fear that Dodd-Frank is a profoundly misguided effort to do many, many other things.

Thank you very much for providing me with this opportunity to introduce Matthew Brann and Judge Mal Mannion before the Committee.

Judge Mannion is an excellent Federal magistrate judge with a solid record as an attorney.