Do you share my concern that this massive explosive growth in the FHA's mortgage guarantee business has interfered with a viable private alternative that does not involve taxpayer risk at all?

Yes. Thank you. And I think as we mentioned in our opening remarks, European Commission effort and the call for evidence provides a framework for doing this cumulative analysis on the effects of all these different and overlapping…

Is it just a coincidence?

So if the cash had not landed, the Americans would not have been released but we should not understand that to be a ransom payment.

This is fraud. That is what this is.

But I think most people understand the meaning of the word 'fraud.'

How does falsely signing a customer up for an account they do not want, how does it not meet that definition?

the reputational damage done to the bank clearly is material, and that has been manifested by this huge adverse movement in stock prices.

We discover that management had far too few common-sense controls in place to prevent the kind of abuse that customers were subject to.

First, we discover that Wells Fargo had a sales culture that was blatantly antithetical to what is best for customers.

I think the market cap lost 9 percent over the last couple of weeks. That is pretty material.

I supported claw backs for executives who commit fraud, misstate earnings, or otherwise engage in wrongful behavior in Dodd-Frank.

We discover Wells Fargo executives completely out of touch.

I was pleased to see that some non-accredited levee systems would be recognized as reducing flood hazard.

I think just this morning, the latest CO-OP announced its failure.

So something like 70 percent have already failed. I am told to expect there will be more failures.

I think that is exactly the right approach. I want to thank you for that.

Taxpayers have put $1.5 billion into the CO-OPs that have failed. That money is just gone.

I think this is a manifestation of the adverse selection that some of us were afraid was going to occur.

I think a layman's reading of a defined population suggests something much narrower than what is contemplated here.

So it strikes me that clearly it is not the payment model that drives the docs to prescribe the 10 highest-expenditure drugs; it is the fact that there is no alternative.

But just so that I understand, it is true that, as I understand it, there are these different subsets that will undergo different experiments.

So to what extent is this unprecedented accommodative monetary policy for these many years now part of the reason that we have had relatively anemic growth today?

My sense of the academic consensus is that the main effect of accommodative monetary policy is to induce economic activity that was going to occur later at an earlier time.

One of my concerns is that the inducement to expand capacity, the unnatural excess capacity that comes from unnaturally low interest rates, could get the Fed into a kind of vicious cycle.