Jim Inhofe

What is your assessment of the state of the munitions industrial base?

How does each service plan to address the growing importance of software maintenance on your depot-level sustainment operations?

What more can Congress do to enable you to hire the civilians you need to increase readiness?

Is weapons system sustainment being adequately incorporated into initial acquisition planning for new weapon systems to ensure these systems can be efficiently and effectively maintained over their life cycles?

What impact does aging infrastructure have on each of the services' ability to increase or sustain readiness?

If yes, please provide examples.

I think that is very significant. That is an excellent answer.

I think that is right.

That logistics and sustainment infrastructure exists to provide for the Nation in times of war, to behave as that buffer and ability to surge.

Only then will our industrial base be able to provide the readiness required of our Navy today and into the future.

I think, even though it is not all that well-defined, I think we have a hollow force today. I am very much concerned about it.

The Army has indicated its need for BRAC repeatedly in testimony.

Should planned modernization programs be delayed or deferred, the Air Force's ability to provide the Nation with credible and effective nuclear deterrence in the future could be at risk.

What is your assessment of the readiness of those nuclear forces to conduct strategic deterrence missions as well as to provide support to regional combatant commanders in the event of a regional crisis or on-going conventional conflict?

The Army must focus equipment modernization on re-establishing overmatch and simultaneously developing new military capabilities to deter and, if necessary, defeat emerging regional and global peer adversaries.

To fund the Air Force that will dominate against a peer adversary requires predictable and sustained investment above current levels.

To what extent has each of your services prepared a long-term funding plan for your modernization efforts?

What are each of your service's priorities over the next five years for modernizing its key combat capabilities?

We have attempted to balance the risk across our force to maintain readiness but have been forced to make unacceptable tradeoffs between readiness, force structure, and modernization.

The Army requires adequate, sustained long-term and predictable funding.

General Allyn, Admiral Moran, General Walters, General Wilson, what interim benchmarks and timelines have been established to ensure progress stays on track?

Will each of the services be able to recruit and retain qualified personnel to fill the ranks of a larger force?

What are each of the services plans for increasing end strength over time? How fast can each service grow?

The budget process is broken.

I would say if we can afford to reach the point where that yield is achieved and realized, I would agree with you.