Jim Inhofe

I think that the municipal bonds are extremely important.

I do not think that was actually in our reauthorization, but it was a consideration at that time.

A modest investment, but as you know, we have a couple that are over 70 years old still in operation today.

This is the equivalent of our interstate highway system, and it has 35 maintenance vehicles to maintain the entire interstate highway.

I've been on them. What's out there that might be--that we might look at and--can you get parts for them?

I thought that our country was not leaning in to nuclear energy like we should have, that we were causing, I think, serious problems in terms of our ability to demonstrate American power.

To come together to work across the aisle to create something as strong as this through a bipartisan effort is really a testimony to Congress.

But if that is what it takes to get you guys on board, I am all for it.

This is really a big deal. This place ought to be mobbed right now.

There is an urgency here, and this is one time that I am proud of Congress, I am proud of the Senate and my colleagues and us coming together to meet a national urgency.

That makes sense. That does. That's a good comment.

So what you're pointing out is that, yes, it is true that if you have to do this--but if you do it to that detail, they'll forget what the real purpose is, whether it's safety or other elements.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Yes, and we appreciate it.

Our potential adversaries' anti-access, area-denial; fires; air defense; electronic warfare; cyber; and space capabilities are all concerning.

The most important measure the nation could take to reduce risk and allow the Army to accumulate readiness, capacity, and modernization improvements is to provide sustained, predictable funding in the base budget.

Given the complex range of threats, the Army has a very short window to improve capability and capacity.

The overmatch your Army has enjoyed for the last 70 years is at risk.

Stretching procurement timelines has allowed us to focus on current readiness and keep production lines and key programs active, at the cost of increased risk versus our most capable adversaries.

We must have sufficient funding to improve today's equipment while at the same time invest in the development of future capabilities.

Are these platforms--even when heavily modified--capable of giving us the kind of technological overmatch to which we are accustomed?

What have we learned from those failures and how are we working to ensure we do not repeat past mistakes?

With ongoing operations showing no real signs of slowing down, how do we change direction to modernize to face future threats?

Yes, that's really, because that's such a cruel thing.

Yes, and that is scary.