Providence seems, indeed, by a special dispensation, to have put down for us, without a struggle, that very paper enemy which the interest of our citizens long since required ourselves to put down, at whatever risk.

The moment is pregnant with futurity, and if not seized at once by Congress, I know not on what shoal our bark is next to be stranded.

It was the misfortune of war that we were compelled to act upon matters of grave importance without that mature deliberation that would be secured in peaceful times.

The measure affected the property of every citizen of the United States, and yet our action for good or evil must be concluded within a few days or weeks of that session.

We therefore must look for some system of finance that would give us all the aid possible, either in the form of paper money or by the agencies of associated banks.

We were then in the peculiar condition of a nation involved in a war without any currency whatever which by law could be used in the ordinary transactions of public business.

We were compelled, by a necessity as urgent as could be imposed upon any legislature, to issue these notes.

They furnished the best substitute for gold and silver that could then be devised, and if we could limit United States notes to the amount then authorized by law they would form a suitable and valuable currency.

While the government had been issuing its paper money some of the banks were inflating the currency, by issuing paper money on the basis of United States money.

The issue of United States notes by the government, and the making them a legal tender, was made the basis of an inflated bank circulation in the country, and there was no way to check this except by uniting the interest of the government…

I said that during war local banks were the natural enemies of a national currency.

Whenever specie payment was suspended, the power to issue a bank note was the same as the power to coin money.

The power granted to the Bank of France and the Bank of England to issue circulating notes was greatly abused during the period of war.

It was a power that ought never to be exercised except by the government, and only when the state was in danger.

It was the power to coin money, because when a bank issued its bill without the restraint of specie payments, it substantially coined money and false money.

This was a privilege that no nation could safely surrender to individuals or banks.

The only power they derived from corporation not granted to all citizens was to issue notes as money, and this power was not necessary to their business or essential to their profit.

Was it not then possible to preserve to the government the exclusive right to issue paper money, and yet not injuriously affect the local banks?

But, it was asked, why look at all to the interest of the banks, why not directly issue the notes of the government, and thus save to the people the interest on the debt represented by the notes in circulation?

The only answer to this was that history taught us that the public faith of a nation alone is not sufficient to maintain a paper currency.

Our revolutionary currency, continental money, depreciated until it became worthless.

The assignats of France, issued during her revolutionary period, shared the same fate.

Other European countries which relied upon government money alone had a similar experience.

An excessive issue of paper money by the government would produce bankruptcy and repudiation, not only of the notes abroad, but of bonds also.

If we increased our circulation, as was then proposed, it would create an inflation that would evidently lead to the derangement of all business affairs in the country.