Martin Heinrich

I think those are all very important investments.

That is to dissuade Russia from thinking that this is a time when they want to test NATO or the Americans.

Do you still view Russia as a significant threat to the United States?

I believe is particularly shortsighted with regard to foreign assistance.

Proactive conflict prevention strategies are far less expensive in terms of resources and lives expended than reactive use of our Armed Forces.

Unfortunately this spans across exposure at Pacific island nuclear test sites in the 1950s, in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, around the Fukushima nuclear disaster, and via depleted Uranium use in current operations.

The recent rise in nuclear threats from countries like North Korea and Iran and non-state actors such as ISIS... puts our service men and woman at increased risk

I would just urge you to look really closely at test ranges generally.

These capabilities are proving to be just as politically disruptive both in our elections and day-to-day business.

It has become really evident to me as a member of both the Intel Committee and this committee--it has become crystal clear that Russia has really mastered this domain of digital disinformation.

The bridging solution provides significant capabilities to SOF, however it does not meet all of our requirements and it is expensive.

The current DCGS-SOF strategy is Government As Integrator (GAI) to integrate best of breed commercial and existing government technologies through an open architecture.

The initial goal of fielding All Source Information Fusion (ASIF) capabilities during the first quarter of Fiscal Year 2017 was delayed for further refinement and integration into the Enterprise.

When will all elements of the DCGS-SOF program reach fully operating capability (FOC)?

It is my understanding that this program is still not fully fielded and is said to have performed poorly during its most recent user testing event.

Since fiscal year 2010, SOCOM has spent $367 million to develop, procure, operate, and maintain its DCGS-SOF program.

I have to say I think that is a very insightful comment, and I would encourage all of my colleagues to make the effort to see our deterrent up close and personal.

I think when they look at them, they get an assessment of the readiness of our force and the ability to provide a deterrent.

The priority has to be the service life extension before we get to new weapons.

I think it is essential that our allies in NATO understand that we are absolutely committed to the alliance.

This obviously comes at a time when the administration has criticized the value of NATO.

Russia didn't do this to help the Republican candidate.

Attribution, obviously, of responsibility in cyber attacks is the first key step towards imposing a cost

It is simply too important for both parties and for the future of our country.

I believe this is going to happen again unless there is a price to be paid.