I support very much what you said because I think it's critical that Iran understand the seriousness of our purpose and the unity behind a strong message to them.

It's also important that Iran hear a very strong, unified message about Congress standing behind strong measures.

banks that find out about high rates of fraud affecting their loans and then do not do anything about them is emblematic of how banks contributed to the financial crisis

There should be a reasonableness test when these subprime mortgages are originated.

You thought they were going to be removed?

Then you ordered a crackdown on early payment defaults at Long Beach, is that correct?

Excuse me for interrupting because we do not have that much time, but I just wanted to go into the numbers.

Shouldn't you have checked to make sure that the fraudulent, tainted mortgages were not part of those securities before you peddled them?

I am talking about those emails. Would you have been concerned then if you had read those emails?

And that was your responsibility to make sure that the securities which went out to the investors were following notice to the investors of everything that they needed to know in order that the information be complete and truthful.

I was deeply concerned to the point where there was no question that this had to be escalated up to the Audit Committee.

Extreme greed was the driving force, and it will happen again unless we change the rules.

Does that mean higher interest rates?

We are going to try to work here.

The recent financial crisis was not a natural disaster. It was a man-made economic assault.

These are very serious allegations. These are high fraud rates.

LBMC [Long Beach] experienced a dramatic increase in EPDs [early payment defaults] during the third quarter of 2005.

These are emails, one after another, delinquency, delinquency, delinquency, we have got to move.

You executed on a bunch of high-risk products.

That is never right. That is never what we represent.

That is what I hoped you would have said.

And the audit that you saw when you first got there, that 2006 audit, which is Exhibit 10, was the reason, as I understand it, that you were asked to take responsibility for Long Beach, is that correct?

And the report said that most of the fraud was due to willful behavior of WaMu employees.

But you said you first became aware of fraud in 2008 and this shows significant fraud in 2007.

Repeat Issue--Underwriting guidelines established to mitigate the risk of unsound underwriting decisions are not always followed . . . accurate reporting and tracking of exceptions to policy does not exist. . . .