Carl Levin

If you had seen those emails--you have heard them. I have read them.

These are emails, one after another, delinquency, delinquency, delinquency, we have got to move.

What you heard today was these loans are delinquent.

Not effective. That is what you were told.

You changed your strategy.

Our Home Loan group should complete its repositioning within the next 12 months.

We went and purchased these loans back.

You are out there selling these securities. You know there is fraud in some of these securities.

Banks that find out about high rates of fraud affecting their loans and then do not do anything about them is emblematic of how banks contributed to the financial crisis

Do you think your investors should be troubled by that? Should your stockholders, should anybody be troubled by that except us?

How does that happen? You have loan officers under investigation year after year after year.

You are out there selling these securities. Do you not have a responsibility to take steps to make sure that fraud ends?

And it was not your job, it was their job, the previous panel's job?

Repeat Issue--Underwriting guidelines established to mitigate the risk of unsound underwriting decisions are not always followed . . . accurate reporting and tracking of exceptions to policy does not exist. . . .

Does that mean higher interest rates?

Did you have concerns about the Option ARM?

In order to generate more sustainable, consistent higher margins within Washington Mutual, the 2005 Strategic Plan calls for a shift in our mix of business, increasing our Credit Risk Tolerance while continuing to mitigate our Market and…

This internal investigation found that WaMu loans marked as containing fraudulent information were nonetheless being sold to investors.

Should you have been?

Why weren't securitizations halted in 2005, 2006, and 2007 when similar underwriting problems were uncovered?

Then you ordered a crackdown on early payment defaults at Long Beach, is that correct?

Now, there was a big appetite for residential mortgages on Wall Street until September 2007, is that true?

We are going to try to work here.

And when WaMu qualified a borrower for an Option ARM loan, did the bank use the payment that the borrower would have to make at a recast or did they use a lower payment?

How does a bank that turns out loans of which 58 or 62 or 83 percent contain misrepresentations or fraudulent borrower information, how does a bank operate that way and expect that there is going to be any confidence in the loans that it…