Vain the requirement of the National Constitution, that the President “shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” Vain that other requirement, that a bill approved by two thirds of both Houses over his veto “shall become a…

To which I reply, that it is not for mistake in judgment, but for usurpation in undertaking to exercise his judgment at all on such a question, that he is impeached; in other words, he is impeached for undertaking to set aside a statute.

The President, after the statute has become a law, is not the person to decide.

It would be an act of unreasoning madness, which President as well as Court must disregard as if plain nonsense.

Its unconstitutionality would be like an axiom, not to be questioned.

Nor would the duty of disobedience be less obligatory, even if the enactment were sanctioned by the Supreme Court: and it is not more violent for me to suppose it sanctioned by the Supreme Court than for the apologists to suppose it…

The enactment would be a self-evident monstrosity, and therefore to be disobeyed, as if one of the Ten Commandments were reversed so as to read, “Thou shalt kill.” Such extreme cases serve no purpose.

In the cases supposed, the unconstitutionally of the enactment is axiomatic, excluding opinion or argument.

I would change the relation of master it now occupies to that of servant, where it properly belongs; and I would inflate the currency with it to the extent that we possess it.

President, I am not alone in asking for the reformation of our currency as the first stage of our financial efforts.

When submitted to the Supreme Court, it is for their “opinion.” Without occupying time with refinements, I content myself with asserting that the judgment of the Court must be matter of opinion.

When a bench of judges stands five to four, shall we say that the majority declare a “fact,” and the minority declare an “opinion”?

Assuming, then, what I think will not be denied, that the constitutionality of a statute is matter of opinion, the question occurs, What opinion shall be regarded for the time as decisive?

Clearly the opinion of Congress must control all executive officers, from the lowest to the President.

A statute must be presumed constitutional, unless on its face the contrary; and no decision of any court is required in its favor.

The maxim which presumes constitutionality is just as binding as the analogous maxim of the Criminal Law which presumes innocence.

But Andrew Jackson never put forth the pretension that it was within his prerogative to nullify a statute which had been passed over his veto in the way prescribed by the National Constitution.

The apologists also summon to their aid those great instances where conscientious citizens have refused obedience to unjust laws.

Such was the case of Hampden, who set an example for all time in refusing to pay ship-money.

Such also was the case of many in our own country, who spurned the Fugitive Slave Bill.

These exalted characters, on their conscience, refused to obey the law, and suffered accordingly.

Such a refusal can be no apology for a President, who, in the name of prerogative, breaks the great oath to see that the laws are faithfully executed.

Rather do these instances, in their moral grandeur, rebuke the offender.

The supremacy of the laws must be preserved, or the liberties of all will suffer.

This famous Opinion, which is without parallel in the annals of jurisprudence, must always be admired as the marvel of technicality in a proceeding where technicality should not intrude.