Can he expect others to do what he would not do himself?

To do so is to violate the spirit of the Constitution.

I submit, if the Atherton gag was unconstitutional, if it was odious, if it was a bad precedent, then you are very rash in establishing this much broader precedent.

You impose a gag not upon petitions merely, but upon the general business of the country.

How should we feel, he has aptly reminded us, if, as a minority, we had such a cup handed to our lips by a patriot Senator?

I could not believe that a Senator, knowing the responsibilities and duties of a Senator, and under the oath of a Senator, could start such a thing.

The proposition was amended, modified, mitigated, losing something of its offensiveness in form, but it still remained substantially offensive.

By that reply I meant that my obligations as a Senator were above any vote in caucus; that I had no right to go into caucus and barter away unquestioned rights on this floor.

And now I submit to my associates in this body, with whom I am proud to act, whose good opinion I value, whether they would have me, feeling as I do regarding this resolution, act otherwise than as I do.

Should I not, as an associate in this Chamber, anxious for the good name of the Senate to which we all belong, proud of this Republic whose honor we hope to bear aloft, and anxious that no precedent should be established which may…

It was our duty to stay and resist the offensive proposition to the last, and then afterward resist it elsewhere.

If placed there, I know it will do no good; it will stay there to the dishonor of the country, and as a bad precedent for the future.

Now I am clear that this debate ought not to be closed without some defined code of caucus, and it seems to me that the learned Senators, so swift in judgment, ought to supply this code.

The indirect are also traced to existing taxation, and their witnesses are crippled trade, unsettled values, oppressive prices, and an inconvertible currency, which of itself is a constant sacrifice.

We should know to what extent one is bound, and to what extent not bound: whether the Senator from Illinois, who refuses to be bound by the caucus in one point, which was fully discussed, is a man of honor; whether another Senator, who…

In following his convictions he is doing right; but then I wish him to understand that others on this floor may have the privilege he claims for himself,--justly claims; it is his title.

I recognize the Senator as a man of honor, though he does refuse to carry out the decrees of the caucus.

I believe that every Senator here has responsibilities as a Senator which are above any he can have to a caucus, which is only a meeting of friends for consultation and for harmony, where each gives up something with a view to a common…

No Senator can expect another Senator to give up anything vital; no Senator can expect another Senator to sacrifice a principle.

If a Senator expects another to accord with him in the conclusions of a caucus, I know well it is because he does not see it in the light of principle; but if another Senator does see it in the light of principle, how can he be expected to…

To repudiate a proposition in favor of human liberty would have been a very different thing from repudiating a proposition against human liberty.

I say there is no difference, where a man promises to do a thing with a full understanding; he has no right to violate it, whether it is one way or the other.

But, plainly, the repudiation of a caucus vote for Human Rights is to be judged differently from the repudiation of a caucus vote adverse to Human Rights,--assuming, as I do, that there is no promise in either case.

The Senator from Maine acts with honor, when he seeks to impose a rule which I think offensive to the spirit of the Constitution.

The Senator from Illinois acts with honor, when he says that he will not be bound by the vote of this caucus in a particular case.