The treaty does provide for less transparency than we would prefer into Russian missile programs.

I look upon it as very beneficial from that perspective and potentially very positive transparency regime.

I think that there is an opportunity to negotiate with the Russians post New START treaty the kinds of exchanges of telemetry and other information regarding ICBMs that we are discussing now?

There are certain reductions in our verification capacities under the proposed New START treaty from what they were under START.

I think this may be the seventh hearing the Senate Armed Services Committee has held on it, and what is clear, I think, I'm sure clear to you is in any treaty, a treaty is a compromise.

If the funding trends continue it is my judgment that the fundamental premise of stockpile stewardship is at risk.

If Congress fails to provide the increased funding requested in the fiscal year 2011 budget... are you certain that our national laboratories will be able to continue to certify the safety, security, and effectiveness of the smaller…

If the telemetry is not required for verification of the Russians' compliance with the treaty, then why even have five?

Most people I talk to, Members in the Senate, would like to get to a point to vote to advise and consent to the New START treaty.

we have put the nuclear weapons program of the United States, NNSA which you direct, under budgetary pressure over the last years.

I hope in the process that Congress will at least fund to the level that the administration has requested for fiscal year 2011.

I think we make the--I understand the difference. We make it harder for our Intelligence Community to gauge exactly what the Russians are developing.

we have sent a letter to you requesting a hearing on the New START.

Are you concerned that if we don't meet the funding increase goals... you may reach a point where you won't be able to certify the safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear stockpile without testing?

As we reduce the number of deployed nuclear weapons in our stockpile, we have to make sure that, to put it in simplistic terms, they work.

I appreciate that, and I stress it again because as you know, anytime anything happens there are immediate investigations done by the media, by Congress, and by the agency itself.

Just that what this tragedy has led to is one more example, fortunately rare, where policymakers and private individuals think out of the box and come up with a remedy.

This is a president who is acting as a commander in chief.

There has been some discussion about different ways in which as we head toward July 2011 we can reassure both the Afghans, their enemies, and the region of our longer-term commitment.

The outcome of the war in Afghanistan was of vital national security interest to the United States.

Mr. Chairman, if I might, just to follow up in terms of messages we might send to the Taliban.

For one who taught international relations for a period, that is a code word. That is a sign of commitment.

vital national interest

You now have my full support for the conduct of these operations and the support of the people in this area.

It's not a deadline for withdrawal. It's not a deadline by which we're going to pick up and go out. It's a goal.