I believe that was a failure of duty to defend the lawfully passed statutes of the United States.

In the near-term, I support the retention of nondeployed warheads as a cost effective risk management approach to ensure our nuclear deterrent remains credible.

With a presumption that it would go into civilian court. That was the policy that the committee you put together recommended--unwisely, I think.

In my view, our current alert posture is not destabilizing.

I think it is leadership from the top.

Isn't it true that other nations depend on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, that there is a political, psychological dimension to clear and strong nuclear capability?

As we deal with the proper level of nuclear weapons, don't we need to consider also what may be in China's plans for the future?

Dr. Miller and General Kehler, what will be the impact of these changes on our ability to hedge against future threats and uncertainties?

In your best military judgment, how prudent is it to begin consideration of reductions past the New START levels?

I think the National Security Advisor's comments were troubling. I don't think they can be blithely set aside.

Why is the administration contemplating changes to well-established nuclear doctrine and targeting requirements?

Current guidance is not 'wrong.'

The New START treaty represents a commitment by the world's two largest powers to the goal of disarmament.

the United States needs a spectrum of nuclear and non-nuclear force employment options and flexibility in planning

the President should provide guidance which all previous Presidents have done without the benefit of that analysis.

Any decisions about nuclear weapons and NATO would not be undertaken unilaterally by the United States, but any decisions would be taken at NATO by NATO.

General Kehler, we were told the balance of forces represented by the New START treaty would be stable and that those force levels were what was necessary to support U.S. deterrence requirements. Why is it necessary to pursue further…

The 2010 NPR examined possible adjustments to the current alert posture of U.S. strategic forces and concluded that the current posture should be maintained for the present.

These are important issues. I don't pretend to know the answers.

One of the problems we have is that as we draw down our weapons, it seems to me that China may have an incentive to seek equivalence with the United States.

Any further reductions should be subject to extensive and serious consultation with our allies.

I will just say if the President had said to the U.S. Senate, the New START treaty is a start toward disarmament, I guess it would have caused more concern than we had.

I got the great concern that ours should be drawn down; and that these nations are really worried that we might reach an agreement that would make the situation even more precarious for them.

reductions in deployed forces should be made on the basis of bilateral agreement with Russia.

I do feel like that President Bush, George W. Bush, our recent President Bush, unilaterally drew down nuclear weapons substantially.