Jeff Sessions

Yes. The United States has significant, unmet goals with regard to further reductions in Russian nuclear forces.

Any further reductions should be subject to extensive and serious consultation with our allies.

Reductions in deployed forces should be made on the basis of bilateral agreement with Russia.

The United States needs a spectrum of nuclear and non-nuclear force employment options and flexibility in planning

I am concerned this administration intends to ignore the importance of achieving strategic balance and establishing a defensive posture that is neither overly reliant nor overly abolitionist towards nuclear deterrence, opting instead for a…

In my view, our current alert posture is not destabilizing.

The purpose of the NPR follow-on analysis is to ensure that our forces remain properly configured for the real threats of today and tomorrow.

The 2010 NPR examined possible adjustments to the current alert posture of U.S. strategic forces and concluded that the current posture should be maintained for the present.

Dr. Miller and General Kehler, what will be the impact of these changes on our ability to hedge against future threats and uncertainties?

Current guidance is not 'wrong.'

Why is the administration contemplating changes to well-established nuclear doctrine and targeting requirements?

In your best military judgment, how prudent is it to begin consideration of reductions past the New START levels?

General Kehler, we were told the balance of forces represented by the New START treaty would be stable and that those force levels were what was necessary to support U.S. deterrence requirements. Why is it necessary to pursue further…

These are important issues. I don't pretend to know the answers.

Any decisions about nuclear weapons and NATO would not be undertaken unilaterally by the United States, but any decisions would be taken at NATO by NATO.

I would refrain from speaking for our allies, but I suspect it would not make some of them feel any better at all.

I got the great concern that ours should be drawn down; and that these nations are really worried that we might reach an agreement that would make the situation even more precarious for them.

I think the National Security Advisor's comments were troubling. I don't think they can be blithely set aside.

As we deal with the proper level of nuclear weapons, don't we need to consider also what may be in China's plans for the future?

The perverse consequence of too much reduction could actually be a proliferation of nuclear weapons in other countries that previously did not feel the need to have them.

Isn't it true that other nations depend on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, that there is a political, psychological dimension to clear and strong nuclear capability?

One of the problems we have is that as we draw down our weapons, it seems to me that China may have an incentive to seek equivalence with the United States.

I do feel like that President Bush, George W. Bush, our recent President Bush, unilaterally drew down nuclear weapons substantially.

Dr. Miller and General Kehler, why did Mr. Donilon suggest a need to re-review our alert posture?

I will just say if the President had said to the U.S. Senate, the New START treaty is a start toward disarmament, I guess it would have caused more concern than we had.