Harold J. Laski

For those habits are not in Nature, which teaches us that opinions we deem evil are fraught with death.

In a time of crisis, particularly, when the things we hold most dear are threatened, we shall find the desire to throw overboard the habits of tolerance, almost irresistible.

I conclude, therefore, that in general we shall not allow, as a society, the mechanisms of the state to serve the cause of freedom unless we approve the objects at which freedom aims.

Yet if you examine the observations of judges in cases where their passions are deeply involved you will note how great is the effort they have to make to show tolerance to antagonistic views.

No class of men is so carefully trained as the judiciary to the habit of a balanced mind.

They will work just so long as people are determined they shall work, and no longer.

You will see, therefore, why I cannot believe that constitutional expedients alone, however substantial, will prevent the invasion of liberty.

Those of whom I speak had no excuse save ignorant prejudice and the blindness of passion.

I speak the language of severity; and I am anxious that you should not think that the language of severity is that of the extremist.

At such times, it is impossible to trust those who are charged with the exercise of power; and only the knowledge that swift and certain punishment will follow its abuse will make our rulers attentive to the needs of freedom.

Yet it is, I think, obvious that unless such breaches are definitely and deliberately punished, they will always occur on critical occasions.

There have been, further, many occasions when breaches of fundamental principles of freedom, breaches which, on any showing, have been quite indefensible, have been followed at once by Acts of Indemnity.

The opinion of Chief Justice Cockburn could not have made the issue more clear; it is a landmark in the judicial history of freedom.

Nothing is clearer than the fact that those who hanged Mr Gordon during the Jamaica riots were guilty of murder.

And let us remember, also, that even where the judge is prepared to do his duty, he cannot, in a period of excitement, count upon public opinion.

No principle is better established than the right of the citizen, under proper circumstances, to a writ of habeas corpus; that is, perhaps, the ark of the covenant in the Anglo-American conception of freedom.

No one now doubts that the Espionage Acts were strained so as to destroy almost all that the first Amendment was intended to cover; that most of the charges preferred under it were, on their face, ludicrous.

It is just as strong, and no more, than the popular will to freedom.

The fact is that any Bill of Rights depends for its efficacy on the determination of the people that it shall be maintained.

All this, I think, is true; but it does not for a moment imply that a Bill of Rights is an automatic guarantee of liberty.

A Bill of Rights, so to say, canonizes the safeguards of freedom; and, thereby, it persuades men to worship at the altar who might not otherwise note its existence.

I believe, for instance, that the existence of the First Amendment has drawn innumerable American citizens to defend freedom of speech who have no atom of sympathy with the purposes for which it is used.

It acts as a rallying-point in the state for all who care deeply for the ideals of freedom.

They warn us that certain popular powers have had to be fought for, and may have to be fought for again.

Bills of Rights are, quite undoubtedly, a check upon possible excess in the government of the day.