On the recordFebruary 10, 2004
I rise to comment on the controversy surrounding the intelligence community's assessments of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs and capabilities in the months leading up to the military action in Iraq. It has been suggested that the intelligence community failed policymakers by presenting a picture of Iraq's WMD capacities that appears to have been far more advanced than the reality on the ground. It has been suggested that, as we have all heard, certain pieces of information were presented as certainties when, in reality, the accuracy of the information was very much in dispute among experts within the intelligence community. I made a concerted effort to go to every briefing that was offered, and I think I largely succeeded, or maybe had entirely succeeded. I went to briefings for all Members, and I also went, of course, to the special briefings that were held for members of the Foreign Relations Committee. I am not a member of the Intelligence Committee and perhaps that committee had access to information dramatically different from what was put before the rest of us. What I recall is that the CIA representatives who briefed us were careful and their statements were qualified. As CIA Director George Tenet recently indicated, it was made clear disagreements existed about how to interpret some pieces of information. What I remember about the CIA is that they played it straight.…
Source
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