I personally would like to, you know, eliminate sequestration entirely.

This is not a foreign threat; this is a self-inflicted wound.

I appreciate the witnesses. I just wanted to make an announcement that, in an effort to be constructive, Congressman Paul Ryan and I have introduced today a bill that would give the Pentagon complete flexibility in making spending…

I just wish we could lock you in one room and get a consensus proposal and then force Congress to act on that.

I hate to ask the painful question about how sequestration will affect your work.

I want to give my colleagues a heads-up--and this doesn't have to be my amendment--but I would encourage my colleagues to jointly work together to figure out some way of granting flexibility here.

I would just like to add my welcome to yours, and I look forward to hearing the testimony of the witnesses.

I hope, perhaps, one side or the other will relent and we can have a conference committee, regular order, and actually maybe agree on a budget.

I would just like to point out for the record that the Commander of Space Command in his testimony said that he needed flexibility.

This does not suggest reducing the amount of cuts. It is just allowing some flexibility.

So reprogramming authority would help reduce the chaos or help the command. I am for it.

I am not for holding Space Command or any part of the military hostage until I get what I want.

It almost seems to me that we need to have a couple of closed-session hearings so that we can talk about some things that cannot be aired in public.

How can we reduce the risk of miscalculation in a crisis?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the patience and courtesy of the witnesses here as we explore these important issues.

I think this Global Zero cause has been misnamed.

I saw four very distinguished Americans who were agreeing on a bipartisan basis that we should at least look at reductions.

I hope that we can approach these vitally important national issues with an air of civility and calm.

I look forward to examining these matters today. They are important to the Nation's security.

Washington should carefully examine going below New START levels of warheads and launchers.

We need to continually revise the effectiveness of what arsenal we have.

What are the risks and benefits of having ICBMs on high-alert?

What we have here today is like a battle of the Ph.D.s, so I look forward to the different testimonies.

What are your thoughts on more cost-effective alternatives for U.S. nuclear deterrence that could assure our allies of the U.S. strong commitment to nuclear umbrella?

Have improvements to yield or accuracy in reaching targets changed the targeting requirements and/or reduced the number of nuclear weapons required?