So, adjust that down over a period of time.

I do think there was a semantics issue, and I just want to point out that let's just say you had a 90-10 model, just for talking purposes. You would have automatically shrunk the public side by 10 percent, immediately on the front end.

This has been an outstanding hearing, and I thank all of you.

And I will say that if Fannie and Freddie in this last go-round had just had a 5 percent capital buffer there would have been zero taxpayer losses.

History will show that I do not think private mortgage insurance will be a very good first-loss position because it would not be there when you need it.

So the impediment is not due to the structure; it is due to us.

If you were scaling up, though, a new entity--let's say you had designed a way to basically move away from Fannie and Freddie in a methodical way...

I am all for private insurance on the portion above 80 percent. I just think as an equity piece that is not really what you are getting.

So does anybody disagree that we ought to be taking advantage of market conditions and taking this balance sheet down in a methodical thoughtful way?

Well, it helps you, though, move to a system more quickly, I think, where you have an explicit Government guarantee.

I am concerned that there is a possibility... that Congress may, in fact, in the name of weighing in, potentially try to pass something that does not do anything.

I think the committee worked very well under the chairman's leadership to produce I think a good piece of legislation.