Ulysses S. Grant

Orders of the government prohibited the expulsion of the negroes from the protection of the army, when they came in voluntarily.

As a subordinate I found that I could not make him do as I wished, and had determined to relieve him from duty that very day.

The battle relieved me from any further anxiety for the safety of the territory within my jurisdiction, and soon after receiving reinforcements I suggested to the general-in-chief a forward movement against Vicksburg.

The enemy was finally driven back with great slaughter: all their charges, made with great gallantry, were repulsed.

We, on the contrary, had to go after our information in force, and then often returned without it.

It was easy, therefore, for the enemy to get early information of our every move.

My desire was to attack Price before Van Dorn could reach Corinth or go to his relief.

I had not force enough at Corinth to attack Price even by stripping everything; and there was danger that before troops could be got from other points he might be far on his way across the Tennessee.

I had all such released the moment I learned of their arrest; and finally sent a staff officer north to release every prisoner who was said to be confined by my order.

On one occasion a correspondent put in my mouth the very charge I had so often refuted--of disloyalty.

The opportunity frequently occurred for me to defend General Buell against what I believed to be most unjust charges.

About three o'clock, being near that point and seeing that the enemy was giving way everywhere else, I gathered up a couple of regiments, or parts of regiments, from troops near by, formed them in line of battle and marched them forward…

To Sherman I told the story of the assault at Fort Donelson, and said that the same tactics would win at Shiloh.

So confident was I before firing had ceased on the 6th that the next day would bring victory to our arms if we could only take the initiative, that I visited each division commander in person before any reinforcements had reached the field.

The Army of the Tennessee lost on that day at least 7,000 men.

Later in the war, while occupying the country between the Tennessee and the Mississippi, I learned that the panic in the Confederate lines had not differed much from that within our own.

In these cases the colonels were constitutional cowards, unfit for any military position; but not so the officers and men led out of danger by them.

There was no hour during the day when there was not heavy firing and generally hard fighting at some point on the line, but seldom at all points at the same time.

If it had been true, as currently reported at the time and yet believed by thousands of people, that Prentiss and his division had been captured in their beds, there would not have been an all-day struggle, with the loss of thousands…

While I was at breakfast, however, heavy firing was heard in the direction of Pittsburg landing, and I hastened there, sending a hurried note to Buell informing him of the reason why I could not meet him at Savannah.

But I feared it was possible that he might make a rapid dash upon Crump's and destroy our transports and stores, most of which were kept at that point, and then retreat before Wallace could be reinforced.

But this did not justify the dispatches which General Halleck sent to Washington, or his subsequent concealment of them from me when pretending to explain the action of my superiors.

There was now no doubt but that the Confederates must surrender or be captured the next day.

We rode rapidly to Smith's quarters, when I explained the situation to him and directed him to charge the enemy's works in his front with his whole division, saying at the same time that he would find nothing but a very thin line to…

It was clear to my mind that the enemy had started to march out with his entire force, except a few pickets, and if our attack could be made on the left before the enemy could redistribute his forces along the line, we would find but…