Hillary Clinton

The Obama administration has provided briefings to, and discussed U.S. missile defense policy, plans, and programs with the Russian government.

New START was created with a view to maintain flexibility by allowing each party to determine for itself how to structure its strategic nuclear forces within the treaty's limits.

There has been no quid pro quo with the Russian Government on the issue of sanctions.

This administration has made clear that the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.

We appreciate the restraint that Russia has implemented over the course of several years in not transferring the S-300 to Iran.

The 2010 Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control... was submitted to Congress on July 1, 2010.

In response to questions from the Senate during the ratification deliberations for the START treaty in 1992, the Bush administration defined a 'militarily significant violation' as 'one which endangers the security of the United States or…

Enhanced cooperation between the United States and Russia in the nuclear arena will contribute to the positive international environment needed to reinforce programs to secure and safeguard nuclear material stockpiles worldwide.

Failure to bring the treaty into force would be a setback for the relationship and could make it more difficult to cooperate in areas of mutual interest.

U.S. leadership in reducing its nuclear arsenal is essential to our efforts to bolster the nonproliferation regime and reduce global nuclear dangers.

U.S. extended deterrence and assurance will remain strong under New START.

The New START treaty does not constrain any of our missile defense plans, including our ability to hedge against future ballistic missile threats.

The relationship between the United States and Russia continues to improve, and the conclusion of the New START treaty reflects our growing cooperation on matters of mutual interest.

We have discussed our nuclear force reductions with our allies and assured them that U.S. nuclear force reductions will be implemented in ways that maintain the reliability and effectiveness of our extended deterrent for all of our allies…

The New START treaty positions the United States to continue its international leadership role in advancing the goals of the NPT regime.

Extended nuclear deterrence will remain strong under the New START treaty, including for those within range of Russian tactical nuclear weapons.

The New START treaty does not constrain the United States from developing and deploying the most effective missile defenses possible.

The unilateral statements are not integral parts of the treaty, and they are not legally binding.

We have consistently told the Russians that, if they wish to work with us on missile defense, we are open to working with them.

I don't know that such a thing exists, but in our very considered opinion, it is so much in America's interest to get on with entering into this treaty.

We share a strong belief that the New START will make our country more secure, and we urge the Senate to ratify it expeditiously.

A rejection of them would indicate that a new period of American policy had started that might rely largely on the unilateral reliance on its nuclear weapons.

We will never get to that step with the Russians on tactical nukes if this treaty on strategic nuclear weapons is not ratified.

I believe that our close cooperation with Russia on negotiating this New START added significantly to our ability to work with them regarding Iran.

This treaty is in our national security interests and that a failure to ratify this treaty would have both foreseen and unforeseen consequences.