Harry Truman

This order shall become effective at the close of business June 30, 1945.

In the light of changed war conditions, a preliminary review of lend-lease assistance to individual nations has been made.

The war against Japan, like the war against Germany, is a cooperative allied effort.

Within the near future I intend to advise the heads of the departments and agencies that whenever they have offices which are located in labor market areas classified in Groups II, III, and IV by the War Manpower Commission they may reduce…

Our blows will destroy their whole modern industrial plant and organization, which they have built up during the past century and which they are now devoting to a hopeless cause.

I want you to stay at your post at least until V-J Day in order that I may have your continued assistance.

I think we would, but there has been no arrangement for such a meeting officially.

I asked him to stay on until I got more familiar with the situation, and he came up yesterday and told me that he would like to quit within the next month; in fact, not later than July 15.

No. Not the slightest.

I have persuaded Sam Rosenman to stay with me for another year, and I am very happy that he is going to do it.

They are depending on America tiring of this war--becoming weary of the sacrifices it demands.

I am declining to accept it.

This order shall be effective from June 1, 1945, until June 30, 1946, unless sooner modified or revoked.

We must see that there is no justification for any such feeling, and that is just what we are going to do.

We have received an enormous amount of mail.

I wish to express my very deep sympathy for the relatives of those members of our armed forces who have the misfortune still to be held as prisoners of war by the enemy.

I would rather wait for another time and give you a complete statement on that.

Read that summary very carefully.

This does not mean, however, that the Japanese have given up hope.

The self-effacing zeal and patriotic devotion with which you have served your country and your President in recent years cannot yet be spared.

They talked to me about it.

The only meeting I have ever discussed has been a Big Three meeting.

I am in favor of the principal parts of it.

The reasons which moved him are the same as those which now prompt this action by me.

Those who have the heavy responsibility of directing the Nation's military efforts do not underestimate the difficulties of crushing an enemy defended by vast distances and animated by desperate fanaticism.