Now, according to this memo, the push to increase loan volume made things worse.

Management Control Weaknesses were identified by you at that first bullet point, which is about two-thirds of the way down.

Look, Mr. Beck, those emails talk about delinquencies, delinquencies, delinquencies.

Thank you. Senator Kaufman.

You have an obligation to tell your purchasers as an underwriter complete and truthful information.

Do you remember saying that we should think seriously about getting rid of these Option ARMs?

And is it true that, as shown in Exhibit 37, at times, 95 percent of WaMu's Option ARM borrowers were making minimum payments, which led to no or negative amortization?

Was there a high risk in doing that?

You are working for a bank which according to a 25-loans test had almost half reflecting a sale after an investigation has confirmed fraud.

So that was a higher interest rate there, as well?

You should have been disturbed by what you heard here today, OK?

If you had seen those emails--you have heard them. I have read them.

Now, there was a big appetite for residential mortgages on Wall Street until September 2007, is that true?

Long Beach represents a real problem for WaMu.

You had all this evidence that there was fraud in various offices of WaMu. Why was that not set up for WaMu's loans?

But by 2005, the problems started erupting again with a surge of early payment defaults.

In order to generate more sustainable, consistent higher margins within Washington Mutual, the 2005 Strategic Plan calls for a shift in our mix of business, increasing our Credit Risk Tolerance while continuing to mitigate our Market and…

Basically they did not want to slow down loan production.

You were aware of it at the time?

Now, in your statement, Mr. Killinger, you described how the Office of Thrift Supervision was on site at WaMu and approved of WaMu's actions.

Should you have been?

It also went to the chairman and chief executive officer, Mr. Killinger. Do you see that on the right?

Were you aware, first, Mr. Rotella, that WaMu employees were cutting corners and even engaging in fraud to meet volume demands?

And then the risk, therefore, would be passed on to the purchasers. Is that correct?

We are talking about these emails, Mr. Killinger.