I am starting to think that instead of the U.S. Congress, we should call ourselves 'Deficits are Us.'

A one-time OCO infusion doesn't necessarily--in fact, given your sort of by definition long-range program, it would not be necessarily all that helpful.

As technology improves around the world, the ability to hold targets at risk wherever they are on the planet is vitally important to our Nation and certainly to the United States Air Force.

The defense budget in 1962 was something like 5-6 percent of GDP. It is now at 3.3.

I want to understand before we undertake a new--before we get too far into a new vehicle, I want to have that opportunity.

The Russian stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons. Is this a gap, if you will, in our deterrent?

Are there practical problems? Please reassure me that we are not going to make something more expensive and difficult by trying to make it interoperable.

That would be pennywise and pound foolish, in my view.

I note that a lot of our nuclear force calculations are based upon applying the terms of the New START treaty.

I think we would have to make some adjustments, but I think we----

My understanding of this idea is just to send a bunch of OCO money to the Pentagon and say, do with it what you will.

They are fully complying?

I commend former Secretary Hagel for initiating it and for your carrying it out.

I think it is the next frontier of warfare.

I wonder if we shouldn't be developing a theory of deterrence similar to nuclear deterrence in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.

It's going to be difficult. But, I'm very happy to have your testimony, this morning, which underlines for this committee and for the country how serious a threat this is to our National security.

Clearly that is where we are. All the testimony both in the Intelligence Committee and Armed Services has been from professionals. They have never seen anything quite like the instability and unpredictability of the world that we are in.

I want to thank you both for your emphasis on the importance of the effect of sequestration on your commands and on your ability to carry out your responsibilities.

I just think it's critical to develop an offensive cyber capability.

As I understand it, it's actually compromised--our failure to be a member of that treaty is actually compromising our ability, for example, to stake claims to where the Continental Shelf is.

I think it would be a tragedy if we pull our forces out of there prematurely.

I am concerned that our cyber-defense system is just that, it is defense, and that we don't have an offensive capability.

It would be helpful to us, in terms of allocating resources to protect against this, to have some analysis.

We are really not adequately, I believe, focusing on our strategic interests in that region.

To build the finest ship with the deadliest battery and to send it afloat with a raw crew, no matter how brave they are individually would be ensure disaster if a foe of average capacity were encountered.